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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED: 
1. Does Jeanne's failure to marshal the evidence prevent 
her from challenging the trial court's findings of fact? 
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review: In order to 
challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the 
challenger "must marshal all the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings in question." Marshall v. Marshall, 915 
P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
2. Were the trial court's findings of fact clearly 
erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence? 
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review. Brent Loveless 
argued the validity of the facts in his trial memorandum. Record 
at 275. The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 
1175 (Utah 1989). 
3. Was the trial court's valuation of the marital property 
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a clear abuse of discretion? 
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review. Brent Loveless 
preserved this issue in his trial memorandum. Record at 275. A 
trial court's valuation of marital property will not be disturbed 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 
P.2d 877, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
4, Does Jeanne's frivolous appeal warrant an award of 
attorney's fees? 
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review. This issue is 
appropriately raised in a Brief to the Court of Appeals. Such an 
award is a matter of discretion for the appellate court. Hunt v. 
Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). 
STATUTES THAT ARE DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
The Appellant has asked this Court only to review Findings 
of Fact, therefore, there are no Statutes that are determinative 
of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order signed and dated the 14th of 
February, 1997. Record at 347. 
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below 
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This matter came before the trial court on September 3, and 
18, 1996. Both parties testified. Central issues were when to 
value the home and if Jeanne Loveless was entitled to any 
interest in the home or its appreciation in value. 
The trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Ruling on 
December 10, 1996. The court awarded Brent Loveless his 
premarital home free of any claim by Jeanne Loveless and valued 
the home at the time of separation. The court signed and entered 
the Order on February 14th, 1997. Jeanne Loveless appeals from 
that Order. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Brent Loveless is the custodial parent of four 
children, who have lived with his children in his present home 
since October 1990. Record at 40. 
2. Brent built the home in which he and his children 
resided before his marriage to Jeanne. He did most of the 
construction himself. Record at 40. 
3. Brent and Jeanne were married on March 11, 1994. Record 
at 40. 
4. Brent and Jeanne maintained separate finances 
throughout the short marriage. Brent paid the household 
expenses, including mortgage, utilities, groceries, taxes, 
telephone service, and other debts from his own checking account 
to which Jeanne did not contribute. Record at 40. 
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5. Before the marriage Brent landscaped the yards and 
property and installed a deck. Only the flower beds were built 
and planted after the marriage. Record at 369. 
6. Brent spent over $2,100 during the marriage in 
completing the downstairs rooms. Record at 370. 
7. In June of 1995, 14 months into the marriage, Jeanne 
secretly and unknown to Brent applied for housing assistance and 
occupancy in an apartment complex in Payson, Utah. Record at 
371. 
8. She misrepresented her marital status on her 
application, and concealed this entire action from Brent. Record 
at 365. 
9. Because of the tight rental market, there was no 
vacancy in the apartment complex at that time. Record at 366. 
10. As soon as an apartment became available in December 
1995, or 21 months after the marriage, Jeanne moved into the 
complex and the parties separated. Record at 371. 
11. Shortly before their marriage, Brent's house was 
refinanced. It was appraised at $98,000. At the time of 
separation (21 months later), the appraised value was $137,000. 
At the time of trial (30 months after the marriage), the 
appraised value was between $137,000 and $143,000. Record at 
392. 
12. All but $6,600 of the increase in value to the home is 
attributable to the appreciation of real estate in Utah County. 
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The remaining $6,600 increase in value is attributable to the 
completion of basement rooms. Record at 395. 
13. Jeanne did little to improve the value of the home 
other than routine maintenance. She purchased some flowers and 
stained the doors and moldings. Jeanne did give her son a 
washer, dryer and bed in exchange for labor. 
14. Brent paid the mortgage payments and utilities on the 
home during the marriage. Record at 40. 
15. Prior to the marriage, Jeanne paid rent of $487 per 
month. After separation, she only paid $361. Record at 367. 
16. The parties never commingled their income. Brent paid 
the family living expenses. Jeanne spent her income on a car 
payment, alcohol, and Sunday dinners. She kept the rest for 
herself. Record at 40. 
17. At the time of marriage, Jeanne worked at Walmart 
making $6.20 per hour. At the time of separation she was earning 
$7.50 working for Neways. At the time of trial she was earning 
$9.00 per hour. Record at 367. 
18. Brent's income remained constant throughout the 
marriage. Record at 375. 
19. Jeanne brought considerable debt into the marriage, 
which was paid off during the marriage with marital funds. 
Record at 372. 
20. Brent incurred debt during the marriage, including 
significant credit card debt incurred after Jeanne began planning 
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her separation in June 1995. Brent would not have incurred these 
expenses had he known of Jeanne's plan to leave him as soon as 
housing was available. Record at 371-72. 
21. The trial court allowed Brent to retain his family's 
premarital home because the home was Brent's before marriage, he 
paid the mortgage and utility expenses from his own income, he 
paid for almost all of the improvements, and the marriage was of 
short duration (the parties married March 1994 and separated 
December 1995, although Jeanne began her plans to separate in 
June 1995). Record at 323. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Jeanne Loveless has failed to "marshal the evidence" as 
required by this Court in order to challenge findings of fact. 
Thus, she should be prevented from challenging those findings. 
Even if she had marshaled the evidence, the trial court's 
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous nor against the great 
weight of the evidence. In fact, the trial court made extensive 
and specific findings which included testimony from the parties. 
It is clear from the record that the trial court's findings were 
well grounded in the evidence before the court. 
In assigning the marital debts, the trial court again made 
specific and extensive findings which are well supported by the 
record. From that record, the trial court acted within its 
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discretion in assigning portions of the marital debt to the 
parties and allowing for offsets of payments. 
The trial court did not "clearly abuse its discretion" in 
assigning a value to Brent's home. While property is generally 
valued at the time of trial, Utah courts have stated that this 
"is not an intractable rule." Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 
563 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The trial court's deviation from the 
general rule must be sufficiently detailed to explain the basis 
its ruling. Id. at 688. The trial court made detailed findings 
in regard to the valuation of Brent's home. The trial court 
correctly judged the respective interests of the parties as of 
the time of separation. 
The trial court acted within its discretion to allow Brent 
to retain his premarital home. The court made extensive findings 
with regard to the payments made to enhance the value of the 
home. In the short duration of the marriage, Jeanne did little 
to add to the value of the home. The payments made by Brent were 
not marital payments since the parties did not commingle their 
funds and Brent was separately responsible for paying the 
mortgage, utility, and tax expenses associated with the house. 
Finally, Brent is entitled to his attorney's fees in this 
appeal. Jeanne Loveless' arguments are frivolous. She has 
failed to marshal the evidence in her attack on the trial court's 
findings of fact. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than 
in the final "Point" of her Brief in which she accuses the trial 
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court of prejudice and "wrongful favoring." Appellants Brief at 
15. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
JEANNE'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE PREVENTS HER FROM 
CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
Jeanne Loveless has failed to "marshal the evidence" as 
required by this Court in order to challenge findings of fact. 
Thus, she should be prevented from challenging those findings. 
This court has stated: 
"[I]n order to challenge a trial court's findings of 
fact on appeal, the challenger must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings in question. We will uphold the 
trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to 
appropriately marshal all of the evidence. 
Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(citations omitted). In viewing this marshaled evidence, the 
evidence must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the 
findings" and the evidence must still be "insufficient to support 
the findings." Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1,7 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
When a party challenging findings of fact fails to marshal 
all of the evidence, the Court of Appeals upholds the trial 
court's findings of fact. See Allred v. Brown, 893 P.2d 1087, 
1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 
882 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Marshall, 915 P.2d at 516. 
Here, Jeanne Loveless has failed to marshal "all of the 
evidence", much less demonstrate why the evidence, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the findings, would be insufficient. 
Instead, she has simply restated the evidence she believes 
supports her position and reargued the original case to this 
Court. In Marshall v. Marshall, this Court was faced with 
similar pleadings. There, the court concluded: 
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence but 
has merely recited the findings on point and then 
highlighted the evidence which he deems contrary to the 
findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial 
court's findings and affirm the awards on appeal. 
915 P.2d at 516. Likewise, in Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, a case 
cited by Jeanne in her brief, the court refused to disturb the 
trial court's findings because the appellant had "not marshaled 
th§ evidence, but had merely reargued the evidence supporting his 
position." 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Similarly, Jeanne has failed to marshal all of the 
evidence. She has failed to show why, when viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. Lastly, she has merely 
reargued the evidence supporting her position. Accordingly, this 
Court should not disturb the trial court's findings of fact and 
should affirm the court's judgment. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF PACT WERE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS NOR 
AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF TH£ EVIDENCE 
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Even if Jeanne had marshaled the evidence, the trial court's 
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous nor against the great 
weight of the evidence. As stated earlier, 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's 
factual findings, an appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings, or that its 
findings are otherwise clearly erroneous. A finding is 
clearly erroneous, when, even though there is evidence 
to support it, the reviewing court is xleft with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.' 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations 
omitted) . Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that "findings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." 
Here, the trial court made extensive and specific findings 
from the separate hearings which included testimony from the 
parties. 
Although Jeanne has failed to specifically identify which 
findings of fact were erroneous, the challenges made to the 
court's findings will each be addressed. 
A. It was within the trial court's discretion to assign marital 
debts. 
One challenge made to the court's findings of fact has to 
deal with the court's assignation of marital debt. In assigning 
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the marital debts, the trial court again made specific and 
extensive findings which are well supported by the record. From 
that record, the trial court acted within its discretion in 
assigning portions of the marital debt to the parties and 
allowing for offsets of payments. 
The only finding with regard to marital debt which is 
challenged by Jeanne is the court's finding that during the 
marriage, $2,531 of marital debt was charged to Brent's 
Mastercard. Record at 322. The court ordered Jeanne to 
reimburse Brent one-half of that debt. Record at 348-49. 
During the marriage, Brent had a Mastercard debt of 
$1,344.85. At the time of separation, 21 months later, the debt 
was $3,716. Record at 384. At the September 3, 1996 hearing, 
Brent stated that these expenses were for grocery and Christmas 
expenses, both for the maintenance of the family. Record at 384. 
This debt was incurred for the benefit of both parties and for 
the family. In finding that this debt was a marital obligation, 
the trial court stated that: 
A significant portion of the credit card debt was 
incurred after Jeanne began planning her separation in 
June 1995 and are expenses which Brent would not have 
incurred had he known of her plan to leave him when 
housing became available. 
December 10, 1996 Ruling, at 7. (Record at 325). The bulk of 
this debt ($2,000) was charged during the time between Jeanne's 
plan to leave the marriage in June 1995 and the separation at the 
end of 1995. As the trial court stated, Brent would never have 
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incurred those debts had he known Jeanne was planning to leave 
him shortly. In such a circumstance, the court was within its 
discretion to designate that debt as a marital obligation and 
require Jeanne to reimburse him one-half of that expense. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S VALUATION OF BRENT LOVELESS' HOME WAS NOT A 
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Jeanne challenges the trial court's finding that Brent's 
home should be valued at the time of separation, rather than at 
the time of trial. 
The trial court's valuation of the property is a finding of 
fact. !3ee Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) . As stated in Breinholt v. Breinholt: 
The trial court's actions regarding the parties' 
property interests are entitled to a presumption of 
validity. Thus, the trial court's valuation of marital 
property will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). As 
with other findings of fact, "[i]f the party challenging the 
finding fails to marshal the supporting evidence, the trial 
court's finding will not be disturbed on appeal." Id. 
Jeanne has failed to marshal the evidence. Looking to the 
merits of her claim, the trial court's decision with regard to 
the valuation of the property is entitled to a presumption of 
validity. With this presumption, and considering the "clear 
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abuse of discretion" standard, the trial court's findings should 
not be disturbed by this Court. 
The trial court's specific finding and reasoning were stated 
as: 
21. Because of Jeanne's actions in applying to rent an 
apartment in June 1995 and in separating in December 
1995, she treated the marriage as over at that time. 
It is appropriate the marriage be treated as over in 
December 1995. Thus, the respective interests of the 
parties in the home and other assets should be fixed as 
of that date. 
23. At the time of the parties separation in December 
1995 the home had a value of $137,000. At the time of 
trial it had a value of $140,000 (Brent's appraiser 
fixed the value at trial at $137,000 and Jeanne's 
appraiser fixed the value at trial at $143,000.) 
December 10, 1996 Ruling, at 4. (Record at 328). 
The trial court did not "clearly abuse its discretion" in 
assigning a value to Brent's home. 
In assigning value to marital assets, Jeanne correctly points to 
a general rule. However, as stated in Morgan v. Morgan: 
While the marital estate is generally valued at the 
time of trial, such is not an intractable rule. 
However, the trial court's findings must be 
sufficiently detailed to explain its basis for 
deviating from the general rule. 
854 P.2d 559, 563 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(citations 
omitted)(emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court abided by this admonition and made 
detailed findings regarding its decision. Some of these 
findings included the fact that Jeanne secretly treated the 
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marriage as over in June 1995 when she applied for other housing. 
Record at 328. While this is an equitable factor, another 
important factor pointed to by the trial court is the relatively 
short duration of the marriage. When Jeanne decided to quit the 
marriage in June 1995, the parties had been married 14 months. At 
the time of separation, they had been married only 21 months. At 
the time of trial, however, in September 1996, they had been 
married 30 months. It was within the discretion of the trial 
court to take these factor into consideration. In this case, 
because the trial court's findings were "sufficiently detailed to 
explain its basis for deviating from the general rule" (Morgan, 
854 P.2d at 563), the trial court has not committed a "clear 
abuse of discretion." Breinholt, 905 P.2d at 882. 
Jeanne does make a passing challenge to the court's 
"accepting the evidence of Brent Loveless' expert regarding the 
value of the marital property at $137,000.00 as of the date of 
separation rather than the evidence of Jeanne's expert which 
fixed the value of the property at $143,000.00 at the time of 
divorce." Appellant's Brief at 12. The trial court analyzed the 
opinions of both appraisers and concluded the value to be 
$140,000, a difference of $3,000 to each side. It should be 
noted that when considering testimony regarding valuation of 
property, the trial court "is entitled to give conflicting 
opinions whatever weight [it] deems appropriate." Weston v. 
Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Here, the trial 
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court analyzed the two expert opinions and concluded the value of 
the home to be $140,000. Even if the trial court would have 
accepted the testimony of one expert, it would have been acting 
within its discretion. There can be no abuse of discretion then, 
when the trial court analyzed each expert's testimony to arrive 
at a value. 
A. It was within the trial court's discretion to let Mr. 
Loveless retain his premarital home. 
Like the valuation of the property, the devision of property 
interests is a finding which is reviewed for under the "abuse of 
discretion" standard. See Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 
1067 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Trial courts are given "considerable 
discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced 
parties." Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
In her Brief, Jeanne refers to the $21,000 in mortgage 
payments made by Brent as payments made from "marital funds." 
However, the trial court's finding that the $21,000 paid by Brent 
was not from marital funds is well grounded in fact and in the 
record. First, Jeanne does not deny that Brent's home was 
separate property before the marriage. Appellant's Brief at 6. 
Nor does Jeanne deny that the only reason for the increase in the 
value of the marital home was "due to an increase in the market 
as well as the finishing of living space in the basement." 
Appellant's Brief at 6. Based on expert testimony, the trial 
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court affixed a value of $6,600 to the increased value added by 
the living space. Record at 328. Finally, Jeanne admits that 
she did not contribute any personal funds to the mortgage 
payment. Rather, he used "his wages." Appellant's Brief at 5. 
The remaining issues for the trial court were whether or not 
his wages were "marital funds" and whether Jeanne's contributions 
were enough to make the home a marital asset. At trial, the 
court heard testimony from Jeanne that she contributed $150 
towards repairing a dishwasher (Record at 366), and that she 
believed she had once deposited $180 into Brent's account (Record 
at 3 68). The parties did not commingle funds and maintained 
separate checking accounts throughout the marriage. Record at 
40. Brent was responsible for and paid for the mortgage, 
utilities, taxes, and groceries. Record at 40. 
The trial court made extensive findings of fact regarding 
Brent's home: 
25. While Jeanne asserts an entitlement to an interest 
in the home, she has not demonstrated her right to such 
an entitlement because: 
a) Brent brought the home into the marriage, 
b) Brent paid for essentially all of the 
improvements to the basement, 
c) Jeanne did little to improve the value of the 
home other than the routine maintenance which 
comes with living in the home and she 
purchased and planted some flowers and she 
stained the doors and moldings. In addition 
Jeanne gave her son a washer, dryer and bed 
in exchange for his labor. 
d) Brent paid the mortgage payments and the 
utilities on the home during the marriage. 
f) The parties never commingled their incomes. 
16 
Brent used his income for family living 
expenses. Jeanne spent her income on her car 
payment, on some of the family extras such as 
alcohol and Sunday dinners, occasional 
allowances for the children and on family 
outings. She kept for herself the rest of her 
funds. Because she was able to keep a 
significant portion of her funds, while Brent 
paid the mortgage payments, Jeanne does not 
have a legitimate claim to a credit for the 
mortgage payments which Brent made. 
December 10, 1996 Ruling, at 4-6. (Record at 326-28)(emphasis 
added). Based on the evidence before the court in, including 
bank records, and testimony at trial, the trial court had 
sufficient evidence to support its findings. In summarizing its 
findings, the trial court restated that M[a]lthough it 
appreciated greatly in value during the marriage, the home was a 
separate asset prior to the marriage and Jeanne did little to 
enhance its value." December 10, 1996 Ruling, at 9. (Record at 
323) . 
In her brief, Jeanne has mis-characterized the decision and 
rationale of the trial court in its decision to award Jeanne no 
interest in the home. The Appellant's Brief states: 
The Trial Court did find that Jeanne did make 
contributions to both the marriage and the property 
including over $21,000.00 in marital income. (R. at 
328). The trial court, however, claimed this was not 
significant because a large portion of the house 
payment went toward interest. The fact that a portion 
of mortgage payments goes to interest as well as 
principle is irrelevant. The payment of over 
$21,000.00 was required to ^maintain and enhance' the 
value of the property or it would have been lost. 
Moreover, such an amount can hardly be considered 
insignificant. 
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Brief of Appellant at 10. These assertions are not at all 
supported by language of the trial court's Ruling. In its 
ruling, the only thing said by the trial court regarding the 
interest and principal on the mortgage is the following: 
22. During the marriage the parties paid over $21,000 
in house payments but because such a large share of the 
payments was applied to interest, in December 1995 the 
mortgage had a balance of $64,000. 
December 10, 1996 Ruling, at 4. (Record at 328). Nowhere does 
the trial court state that Jeanne's interest was somehow affected 
by the interest and principal of the mortgage. Further, the 
trial court does not refer to such payments as "insignificant." 
Later, the trial court does state that Jeanne "did little to 
enhance [the home's] value." Record at 323. In short, Jeanne 
has attempted to mis-characterize the reasoning and findings of 
the trial court. 
Jeanne goes cites Schaumberg v. Schaumberg for the 
proposition that she should be awarded "a one-half interest with 
no monetary contribution to the property on her part." 
Appellant's Brief at 7. The facts of Schaumberg are clearly 
distinguishable from the present case. Schaumberg involved the 
valuation and awarding of inherited property. Such is not the 
case here. More significantly, the parties in Schaumberg were 
married for over 25 years at the time of divorce. In the present 
case, the parties were married 14 months when Jeanne decided to 
secretly arrange to leave and the marriage was 21 months old when 
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she did leave. When taken into account with the other evidence 
in the record, namely the lack of commingling of funds, Brent's 
major financial and emotional investment in his own house he 
built, and Jeanne's failure to contribute to the property in any 
significant way, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
letting Brent retain his own home free of any claim by Jeanne. 
Accordingly, she was not entitled to any appreciation of the 
value of the home during the time of the marriage. 
POINT IV 
JEANNE'S FRIVOLOUS APPEAL WARRANTS AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The appellate courts may award attorney's fees for frivolous 
appeals. See Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). A 
frivolous appeal is defined as "one in which no justiciable 
question has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as 
devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever 
succeed." Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, Brent is entitled to his attorney's fees in this 
appeal. Jeanne Loveless' arguments are frivolous. She has 
failed to marshal the evidence in an attack on the trial court's 
findings of fact. There are few relevant citations to case law. 
Jeanne mis-characterized the trial court's decision in valuation 
of the home as one based on interest payments. See infra, Point 
III (A) . Two of the Four Points in Jeanne's appellate brief are 
not supported by any citation to authority. 
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Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in the final 
"Point" of her Brief in which she accuses the trial court of 
prejudice and "wrongful favoring." Appellants Brief at 15. 
Accordingly, Brent Loveless is entitled to his attorney's fees in 
defending this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Jeanne Loveless has failed to "marshal the evidence" as 
required by this Court in order to challenge findings of fact. 
Thus, she should be prevented from challenging the trial court's 
findings of fact. 
Even if she had marshaled the evidence, the trial court's 
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous nor against the great 
weight of the evidence. In fact, the trial court made extensive 
and specific findings based on motions, memoranda, affidavits, 
and two separate hearings which included testimony from the 
parties. It is clear from the record that the trial court's 
findings were well grounded in the evidence before the court. 
The trial court did not "clearly abuse its discretion" in 
assigning a value to Brent's home. While property is generally 
valued at the time of trial, Utah courts have stated that this 
"is not an intractable rule." Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 
563 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The trial court's deviation from the 
general rule must be sufficiently detailed to explain the basis 
its ruling. Id. at 563. Here, the trial court made detailed and 
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extensive findings in regard to the valuation of Brent's home. 
The trial court correctly judged the respective interests of the 
parties as of the time of separation. 
The trial court acted within its discretion to allow Brent 
to retain his premarital home. The court made extensive findings 
with regard to the payments made by each party toward enhancing 
the value of the home. In the short duration of the marriage, 
Jeanne did little to add to the value of the home. The payments 
made by Brent were not marital payments since the parties did not 
commingle their funds and Brent was separately responsible for 
paying the mortgage, groceries, utilities, and tax expenses 
associated with the house and the household. 
Finally, Brent is entitled to his attorney's fees in this 
appeal. Jeanne Loveless' arguments are frivolous. She has 
failed the fundamental requirement to marshal the evidence in her 
attack on the trial court's findings of fact. Nowhere is this 
more clearly illustrated than in the final "Point" of her Brief 
in which she accuses the trial court of prejudice and "wrongful 
favoring." Appellants Brief at 15. 
Accordingly, it is requested that the court rule on all 
issues presented, and affirm the trial court's decision and award 
Brent Loveless his attorney fees on appeal. 
Dated this /Y day of October, 1997. 
. Youfng ~Y^ 
Attorney for Plaittciff/Appellee 
rent D 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
B. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
C. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) 
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isd striking his pleadings in divorce proceed- 9. Divorce e=>286(3.1) 
jug, even if default was partially based on Court of Appeals will not disturb alimo-
jmproper ground of husband's failure to pay ny award absent a clear and prejudicial 
mpport arrearages; default was supported abuse of the considerable discretion granted 
on basis of noncompliance with discovery or- the trial court in determining award. 
<fers, where husband secreted approximately 
$180,000 in income while insisting to court 10- D i v o r c e **«*> m>^* 
that he had insufficient income to pay an With respect to alimony award in di-
additional $1,000 in support, where he never v o r c e proceeding, trial court must consider 
presented required statements proving tax the financial conditions and needs of the re-
payments which allegedly accounted for his ceiving spouse, the ability of receiving spouse 
feck of funds, and where he failed to provide to produce a sufficient income, and the ability 
documentation of several savings and invest- <rf supporting spouse to provide support; fail-
ment accounts. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule ™& to consider those factors is abuse of 
87(b)(2)(C). discretion. 
4 Appeal and Error <3=*961 
Pretrial Procedure <s=>44.1 
Trial court has broad discretion to im-
pose discovery sanctions upon a noncomply-
iag party, and Court of Appeals will not 
reverse trial judge's decision to impose such 
sanctions absent an abuse of that discretion. 
5. Pretrial Procedure @=»44.1 
Discovery sanctions are intended to de-
ter misconduct and require a showing of 
*fflftilness, bad faith, or fault. 
*» Pretrial Procedure <S=>44.1,46 
Striking of pleadings, entering of de-
*°fc, and rendering of judgment against a 
Obedient party are the most severe of the 
Potential discovery sanctions that can be im-
j * 8 ^ upon a nonresponding party; because 
^verity of this type of sanction, trial 
?°^ s r^nge of discretion is more narrow 
^
n
 when the court is imposing less severe 
•auctions. 
' Divorce <3=>85 
Judicial system is not to be manipulated 
o^orce proceedings by one who actively 
a8gressively misleads the court and the 
^ ^ g party. 
"ivorce @»287 
demand of alimony award for findings 
^ / ^ of the required factors was neces-
J^^here Court of Appeals could not de-
jw, e the basis of the award or whether 
court abused its discretion in the 
^ ^ of the award. 
1L Divorce <3=»243, 286(9) 
In awarding alimony in divorce proceed-
ing, trial court must make sufficiently de-
tailed findings on each of the three pre-
scribed factors to enable reviewing court to 
ensure that trial court's discretionary deter-
mination was rationally based upon those 
factors; if sufficient findings are not made, 
reviewing court must reverse unless the rec-
ord is clear and uncontroverted so as to allow 
court to apply the factors as a matter of law. 
12. Divorce <s=>278.1 
Ex-husband did not properly marshal all 
evidence in support of trial court's findings 
regarding value of marital property and then 
demonstrate insufficiency of evidence to sup-
port findings, as required when challenging 
those findings on appeal, where he merely 
recited the findings on point and then high-
lighted the evidence which he deemed con-
trary to the findings. 
13. Appeal and Error <s=>757(3) 
In order to challenge trial court's find-
ings of facts on appeal, challenger must mar-
shal all the evidence in support of the find-
ings and then demonstrate that the evidence 
is insufficient to support those findings; 
Court of Appeals will uphold trial court's 
findings of fact if appellant fails to appropri-
ately marshal all of the evidence. 
14. Divorce <^ =>253(3) 
Where one party in divorce proceeding 
has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or 
otherwise acted obstructively, trial court 
may, under its broad discretion, value the 
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property at an earlier date, i.e., date of sepa-
ration. 
15. Divorce ®=>85, 253(3) 
Trial court acted well within its discre-
tion at divorce proceeding in valuing marital 
property at time of parties' separation, as 
opposed to valuing the property at the time 
of trial, where husband failed to give accu-
rate, verifiable accountings of his income and 
assets. 
16. Divorce @=>221,287 
Trial court's findings and conclusions 
with respect to award of attorney fees to wife 
in divorce proceeding were insufficient to 
allow a meaningful review of trial court's 
ruling, though trial court found wife's attor-
ney fees were "necessary," where it made no 
finding regarding wife's need for such fees, 
and where it also awarded substantial marital 
assets to wife. U.OA.1953,30-3-3. 
17. Divorce ®=>226,286(9) 
Decision to award attorney fees in di-
vorce action must be based upon evidence of 
the financial need of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of other spouse to pay, and the rea-
sonableness of the requested fees; failure to 
consider any of those factors is grounds for 
reversal on fee issue. U.CJL1953, 30-3-5. 
18* Divorce <£»287 
Wife who prevailed on central issue of 
husband's appeal of divorce judgment would 
be awarded attorney fees incurred as result 
of appeal if trial court determined on re-
mand, following consideration of the three 
required factors, that she was entitled to 
attorney fees for trial-level proceedings. 
19. Divorce <8=>194 
Generally, when fees in divorce case are 
granted to prevailing party at trial court, and 
that party in turn prevails on appeal, then 
fees will also be awarded on appeal. 
20. Divorce <3=>312.7 
District court was required on remand 
to incorporate into divorce decree the juve-
nile court's order regarding custody and visi-
tation, where district court had certified 
those issues to juvenile court, where parties 
subsequently entered into stipulation on 
those issues which was approved by juvenile 
court, and where juvenile court order provi<j. 
ed that it would be incorporated into divop^  
decree and would be binding on the partis 
as though entered in district court U.Cj^  
1953, 78-3a-17. 
21. Divorce <3=287 
Court of Appeals declined to discugg 
husband's claim that child support awarded 
at divorce proceeding was incorrect, where 
trial court was found not to have deviated 
from child support guidelines. U.CJU953 
78-45-7.12. 
22. Divorce <£=>181 
Court of Appeals rejected husband's re-
quest that trial judge in divorce proceeding 
be recused from case where husband failed 
to brief issue on appeal. 
Fourth District, Utah County; The Honor-
able Ray M. Harding. 
Helen E. Christian, Gustin & Christian, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Samuel King and David J. Friel, King, 
Friel & Colton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee! 
Before DAVIS, Associate P.J., and 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Donald R. Marshall appeals from a final 
decree of divorce and related matters. We 
affirm in part and reverse in part 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In June of 1992, plaintiff filed for divorce. 
An order to show cause was obtained ty 
plaintiff which, in pertinent part, addressri 
temporary alimony and child support A 
hearing was held on the matter September 1< 
1992. Defendant did not attend the heart* 
and, although aware of the hearing date 
defendant's counsel was not present becaart 
of a scheduling conflict In defendant's # 
sence, the court entered an order which #« 
quired that he pay $4122 per month in ctf* 
support and $3500 per month in alim«# 
MARSHALL v. 
Cite •» 915 P.2d 508 
defendant objected to this order and re-
quested a rehearing on*the issues. The trial 
court granted defendant's request, and an-
other hearing was held on October 7, 1992. 
this second hearing resulted in a reduction 
tf the child support to $3000 per month,1 but 
the alimony remained at $3500. The support 
payments were retroactive to August 1992. 
Both parties were also ordered to refrain 
from disbursing, disposing of, or encumber-
jog any assets without the consent of the 
other. 
Shortly thereafter, on December 4, 1992, 
fjfarintif? obtained an order to show cause 
Regarding defendant's contempt for his fail-
ire to pay the full amount of the court-
fcdered support. Defendant paid plaintiff 
oriy $5500 per month, instead of the required 
IffiOO. In response, defendant filed a veri-
fcd motion for relief requesting, among oth-
* things, that the alimony be redueed from 
*8500 to $1600, retroactive to August 1992. 
A hearing on those matters was held January 
*> 1993. On February 1, 1993, the trial 
J^ut, by memorandum decision, found there 
**6 sufficient evidence to sustain the tempo-
^ alimony award and also found defendant 
* contempt for his failure to pay the addi-
*AaI $1000 per month. Defendant subse-
?*nfty filed a motion for reconsideration or, 
11
 the alternative, a motion to set aside the 
*b*> arguing the contempt order should be 
J^ ersed and the amount of alimony reduced. 
J* April 5, 1993, by memorandum decision,2 
7* court partially granted defendant's mo-
?* and vacated the finding of contempt. 
*°*ever, the court again upheld the alimony 
JJ^t and awarded judgment to plaintiff in 
^ o u n t of $6000, reflecting the amount of 
* support arrearages. 
J^ cause there had been allegations of 
r^* the issues of child custody and visita-
a ?| Were certified by the district court to the 
gj^e court on May 19, 1993. The parties 
p^quently entered into a stipulation re-
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garding custody and visitation, which was 
approved by the juvenile court on November 
16, 1993. The custody and visitation order 
provided, among other things, that plaintiff 
and defendant were to have joint legal custo-
dy of the children. The order also provided 
that it shall be "incorporated into the terms 
of the decree of divorce, and shall be binding 
on the parties to the divorce action as though 
entered in the District Court, in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-17." The case 
was then sent back to the district court for 
resolution of the other pending issues. 
On March 10,1994, plaintiff filed a "Motion 
for Order to Show Cause," s which was based 
upon several grounds, including defendant's 
failure to comply with discovery, his failure 
to pay the additional $1000 per month in 
support, and his concealment of assets. 
Plaintiffs memorandum in support of her 
motion alleged numerous occasions on which 
defendant had failed to comply with discov-
ery. Plaintiff requested "that defendant be 
ordered, within 30 days, to completely com-
ply with all discovery requests," that defen-
dant be defaulted, and that he be found in 
contempt of court for his failure to pay the 
court-ordered support payments. Defendant 
responded by denying plaintiffs allegations 
and requesting immediate relief from the 
$3500 per month alimony award.4 After a 
hearing, the trial court entered an order on 
May 27,1994, which provided in part: 
6. Both parties are to provide statements 
of any and all assets sold, transferred, 
hypothecated or otherwise handled or dis-
posed of from the time the divorce was 
filed up to the present time. The accounts 
ing should be done strictly within the nor-
mal accounting procedures, and all founda-
tion and background documents must be 
ij^cndant had argued, however, that the child 3. Although plaintiff tides the "motion" an "order 
ort be reduced to $2000. 
"vr* record does not reflect that a hearing was 
1
 on defendant's motion for reconsideration 
t an order was prepared and signed subse-
t to the memorandum decision. 
to show cause," an order to show cause was 
never signed by the trial court and it was treated 
as a motion. This was also the case in subse-
quent "motions for an order to show cause." 
4. Each time defendant requested a reduction in 
the alimony amount, he claimed he did not have 
the income to pay the court-ordered amount. 
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provided to show the amounts of the sale, 
to whom, the distribution of those funds 
upon receipt and where they are presently 
located. No further assets are to be sold 
or transferred from this point on. 
7. Defendant is to submit statements of 
all accounts in which defendant has an 
interest. Plaintiff asserts she needs dis-
covery of more accounts than defendant 
has submitted 
9. All financial records from each party 
are to be submitted to the other by May 
20, 1994, which should include credit card 
records, bank statements, canceled checks, 
etc. 
The court also denied defendant's request to 
lower the alimony award and granted plain-
tiff a judgment against defendant in the 
amount of $21,9555 for defendant's support 
arrearages. 
In June of 1994, plaintiff began garnishing 
defendant's wages in an attempt to collect 
the judgment Interrogatories were sent to 
defendant's employer, Prudential Securities. 
As a result of Prudential's answers to the 
interrogatories, plaintiff discovered that al-
though defendant had earlier disclosed that 
he had a certain "Command Account" with 
Prudential, he had failed to reveal that he 
also had three others. Furthermore, while 
defendant testified at his deposition that he 
did not have any stocks with Prudential, 
Prudential's interrogatory answers revealed 
that he held "five groups of stock having a 
face value of $58,000." 
When plaintiff began garnishing defen-
dant's wages, defendant made a partial pay-
ment in July 1994, but then stopped making 
the monthly $5500 payment6 Thus, on Au-
gust 19, 1994, plaintiff filed yet another mo-
tion for an order to show cause, seeking 
another judgment for the support arrearages 
and an order of contempt for defendant's 
failure to comply with the support order, his 
failure to comply with the May 27, 1994 
5. This amount included the prior $6000 in ar-
rearages which had been reduced to judgment on 
April 5, 1993 and $955 interest thereon. 
discovery order, and his intentional withhold, 
ing of information regarding his accounts 
with Prudential. 
On September 9, 1994, before the August 
19 motion for an order to show cause was 
heard, plaintiff filed a motion for "(1) Default 
on Defendant and/or (2) Obtaining Leg^ 
Fees to Continue Discovery and (3) Con-
tempt." Plaintiff requested that defendant 
be defaulted for his continued failure to com. 
ply with discovery or, in the alternative, an 
order compelling defendant to pay plaintiff 
$25,000 so that she could complete discovery. 
Plaintiff also requested that defendant be 
found in contempt for defying the orders of 
the court In plaintiff's supporting memo-
randa, thirteen instances of defendant's fail-
ure to provide discovery documents were 
specifically outlined. Plaintiff also illustrated 
how defendant had failed to comply with the 
court's discovery orders. 
Defendant responded to plaintiff's motions 
on September 23^ 1994. Accompanying d^ 
fendant's response was "Defendant's Verified 
Statement in Re: Expenses Paid With De-
fendant's 1994 Year-To-Date Income." This 
document revealed that defendant had di-
verted $95,479.49 of his income in 1992 and 
$84,077.74 in 1993 without the knowledge of 
plaintiff or the court This information sug-
gested that he did have sufficient income to 
cover the additional $1000 per month he had 
failed to pay since August 1,1992. 
Plaintiff's August 19 and September 9 mo-
tions were heard on September 27, 1994. 
Plaintiff was present with her counsel and 
defendant's counsel was present The court 
heard arguments of counsel; the record does 
not reflect the introduction of any evidence. 
As a result of the September 27, 1994 
hearing, the trial court entered an order on 
November 1, 1994. This order provided that 
plaintiff be given a $20,000 judgment for the 
support delinquencies for April 1994 through 
September 1994. Paragraph three of the 
order provided that because plaintiff "needs 
her delinquencies paid in order to fund nec-
6. Defendant's justification for this was that the 
garnishment was in lieu of support payments. 
MARSHALL v. 
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essary trial preparation, Defendant is or-
dered to pay his delinquencies in full, $41,-
849.71, by November 15, 1994, or he will be 
defaulted." Defendant objected to the order, 
arguing it was improper for the court to 
enter an order forcing defendant to pay sup-
port arrearages or his default would be en-
tered. The court overruled defendant's ob-
jection. 
.As a result of defendant's failure to comply 
with the court's November 1, 1994 order, the 
court entered an Order of Default on Novem-
ber 30,1994. The Order of Default provided, 
in pertinent part: 
In this action the Defendant . . . having 
been served through his counsel . . . on 
September 27, 1994, with the Plaintiffs 
Proposed Order on Order to Show Cause 
and on Plaintiffs Motion to Default and 
Defendant's Counterclaim to Reduce Sup-
port, and said Order having been entered 
by the Court November 1, 1994, . . . and 
having not complied with paragraph 3 of 
said Order, now therefore pursuant to the 
terms of that Order, the Default of said 
Defendant in the premises is hereby duly 
entered according to law. 
Defendant filed a motion to set aside the 
*&ult on December 6, 1994, arguing the 
«al court abused its discretion by entering 
pendant's default for his failure to pay the 
Ndgment for his support delinquencies. 
Without notice to defendant, an evidentia-
2 tearing was held on December 8, 1994, 
7 ^ which the trial court received evi-
^ ^ in the form of testimony and exhibits 
* toe merits of the divorce.7 At this time, 
e
 trial court signed the proposed findings 
* *ule 55(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
***** Provides 
Wjfter entry of the default of any party, . . . it 
•oall not be necessary to give such party in 
ctault any notice of action taken or to be 
^^Q or to serve any notice or paper otherwise 
[Squired by these rules to be served on a party 
***
e
 action or proceeding. 
^^jUnc pro tunc order is used to "correct the 
jj^r^8 omission or error." In re Estate of Leone, 
^P.2d 973, 978 (Utah App.1993). However, a 
^ . P^ o tunc order may not be used to address 
t ^ e not previously before the court. Id. In 
Case
. the court utilized the nunc pro tunc 
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of fact and coodusions of law, but did not 
enter them pending a hearing .set for Janu-
ary 9, 1995, on defendant's contempt and his 
motion to set aside the entry of default. 
[1] Apparently in response to defendant's 
motion to set aside default, the trial court 
filed an "Order Clarifying Default" nunc pro 
tunc8 on December 19, 1994.9 This clarify-
ing order stated that defendant's position 
that the default was entered based on defen-
dant's failure to pay his delinquent support 
was "inaccurate," and went on to say 
3. At the hearing September 27,1994, the 
Court, was persuaded, based on the Plead-
ings filed by the parties and their in-Court 
arguments, that Plaintiff was unable to 
determine the size of the marital estate. 
This was because it was all in Defendant's 
control and he was hiding the assets con-
trary to the Court's Order he disclose 
them. Plaintiff asked that Defendant be 
defaulted— 
7. The Court finds that Defendant's pat-
tern in . . . (2) taking all known assets (a 
minimum of $552,000.00 at the time of 
separation, these being solely in liquid as-
sets held at his employer Prudential Secu-
rities), and converting them to unknown 
accounts and refusing to reveal any of 
them to Plaintiff or the Court 
9. In her Motion for Default, Plaintiff 
submitted pertinent Rules and Utah case 
law justifying on the spot default in such 
situations.10 
(Emphasis added.) 
order to correct the court's earlier error in not 
sufficiently stating the grounds justifying the en-
try of defendant's default. 
9. At the December 8, 1994 hearing, plaintiff sug-
gested the court enter this nunc pro tunc order to 
clarify the grounds for defendant's default. The 
trial court agreed and directed plaintiff to pre-
pare the order. 
10. Plaintiff's motion for default relied in part on 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which in pertinent part provides: 
(2) If a party . . . fails to obey an order to 
provide or permit discovery . . . the court in 
which the action is pending may make such 
514 Utah 915 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
On the same day the court entered the 
clarifying order, the court entered another 
order captioned "order and notice of hearing" 
which, in pertinent part, provided: 
9. The Courts [sic] [November 1, 19U] 
Order to pay delinquencies or be default-
ed[] did not state the underlying reasons 
for the Default Order. 
10. To deal with this the Court directed 
Plaintiffs counsel to submit a Clarifying 
Order of Default setting forth the Court's 
reasons. The Order was to include by 
reference pleadings pending before the 
Court on September 27, 1994, together 
with the content of the Findings, Conclu-
sions, and Decree, these all together stat-
ing the reasons underlying Defendant's 
being in a position to be defaulted 
(Emphasis added.) The order also provided 
defendant notice of the hearing to be held on 
January 9, 1995, which would address defen-
dant's motion to set aside the default and the 
entry of the findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and decree of divorce. Additionally, de-
fendant was ordered to personally appear at 
the January 9 hearing to address his con-
tempt and the appropriate sanctions. 
Although the January 9, 1995 hearing was 
held as scheduled, defendant failed to appear, 
citing threats on his life by plaintiff and their 
son and a new job as reasons justifying his 
absence. Following the January 9 hearing, 
the trial court entered the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and decree of divorce 
from the December 8, 1994 evidentiary pro-
ceeding and entered an order on March 6, 
1995, titled "Order From Hearing Dated Jan-
uary 9, 1995, Re: Contempt and Other Is-
sues." In the findings of fact supporting the 
March 6 order, the trial court found, in rele-
vant part, that: (1) defendant's consistent 
position that he did not have sufficient in-
come to pay the additional $1000 per month 
was a falsehood; (2) in defiance of the court's 
discovery order, defendant had steadfastly 
refused to revest all of the accounts in which 
he had an interest; (3) defendant had failed 
to pay support since July 1, 1994; (4) defen-
dant willfully failed to appear at the January 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and 
among others the following: ' 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts 
thereof, staying further proceedings until the 
9, 1994 hearing without good cause; (5) "it fe 
appropriate that Defendant's pleading ^ 
stricken if for no other reason than on the 
basis of his non payment of child support? 
and (6) "[t]he Court did expressly give the 
Defendant the opportunity to provide discos 
ery in an appropriate manner which ke 
failed to do. And as a result of these things 
the court felt that his default should be en-
tered and pleadings stricken11 (Emphasis 
added.) The court concluded, in relevant 
part, that (1) a bench warrant should be 
issued for defendant's arrest and (2) defen-
dant's motion to set aside the default should 
be denied. Accordingly, based on the find, 
ings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial 
court ordered, in pertinent part, that Q) 
"Defendant has not adequately provided dis-
covery pursuant to Court Order and as such 
it is appropriate that his pleadings be stride, 
en;" and (2) that a bench warrant be issued 
for defendant's arrest (Emphasis added.) 
Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES 
[2] Defendant raises numerous issues on 
appeal. Defendant first argues the trial 
court did not have a legal basis to enter a 
default against him and, therefore, abused its 
discretion in doing so. Defendant next chal-
lenges the alimony award, asserting both 
that the evidence does not support the alimo-
ny awarded to plaintiff and that the trial 
court failed to make the necessary findings of 
fact Defendant also challenges the child 
support award, claiming the amount awarded 
is contrary to the Child Support Guidelines. 
Defendant next alleges the trial court abused 
its discretion in valuing and dividing the mar-
ital estate. Defendant argues the trial 
court's award of attorney fees to plaintiff 
should be reversed because the trial court 
failed to make the required findings. Lastly, 
defendant claims the trial court erred by not 
order is obeyed, dismissing the action or pro* 
ceeding or any part thereof, or rendering * 
judgment by default against the disobedia* 
party. 
MARSHALL v. 
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including the provisions of the juvenile 
court's order regarding custody and visita-
tion into the divorce decree.11 
ANALYSIS 
A. Default 
[3] Defendant claims the trial court en-
tered his default because he failed to pay his 
past due temporary support obligations. Al-
though the court's November 1 and Novem-
ber 30 orders support defendant's argument, 
subsequent orders demonstrate the trial 
judge defaulted defendant based on his fail-
ure to comply with discovery. Furthermore, 
defendant was put on notice that plaintiff was 
seeking default as a sanction for defendant's 
wilful noncompliance with discovery requests. 
Two of plaintiffs motions, one filed on March 
10,1994, and the other filed on September 9, 
1994, requested that defendant be defaulted 
for his failure to comply with discovery. At 
the September 27, 1994 hearing, the trial 
eourt heard plaintiffs September 9 motion 
for default from which the order of default 
arose. 
Additionally, at the January 9, 1996 hear-
ing the court stated to the parties that defen-
dant was given numerous opportunities to 
comply with discovery "which he failed to 
*>" Consequently, the trial court denied 
Pendant's motion to set aside his default 
and reinstate his pleadings. In the March 6, 
1995 order, the trial court again specifically 
*kted, "Defendant has not adequately pro-
ved discovery pursuant to Court Order and 
88
 such it is appropriate that his pleadings be 
8tricken." Accordingly, it is clear the 
Sounds for entering defendant's default 
^ e his failure to comply with discovery, as 
^ as his failure to pay the court-ordered 
^Pport. Thus, the issue becomes whether, 
^
e r these circumstances, the trial court 
•"Used its discretion by entering the default 
^ striking the pleadings. 
The trial court has broad discretion 
impose discovery sanctions upon a non-
' Although the Statement of the Case section of 
pendant's brief states that the propriety of the 
P^ch warrant is also on appeal, it is not men-
anywhere else in the brief. Thus, because 
issue was not briefed, we do not address it. t^ 
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complying party. Utah Dept of Transp. v. 
Osguthvrpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). We 
will not Teverse a trial judge's decision to 
impose discovery sanctions absent an abuse 
of that discretion. Arnica Mvt Ins, Co. v. 
ScheMer, 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah App.1989). 
Discovery sanctions are intended to deter 
misconduct and require a showing of willful-
ness, bad faith, or fault Osguihorpe, 892 
P.2dat8. 
[6] "The striking of pleadings, entering 
of default, and rendering of judgment against 
a disobedient party are the most severe of 
the potential sanctions that can be imposed 
upon a nonresponding party." Id. at 7. Be-
cause of the severity of this type of sanction, 
'the trial court's range of discretion is more 
narrow than when the court is imposing less 
severe sanctions." Id. at 8. 
In the case at bar, defendant secreted 
approximately $180,000 of his income while 
insisting to the court that he had insufficient 
income to pay an additional $1000 per month 
in support When defendant finally disclosed 
what he had done, he explained the absence 
of these funds by presenting copies of the 
faces of cashier's checks purportedly sent to 
the Internal Revenue Service and the State 
of Arizona for tax liabilities. However, de-
fendant has never presented the statements 
evidencing payment of these obligations in 
compliance with the May 27, 1994 discovery 
order. Defendant also failed to reveal sever-
al savings and investment accounts he held 
with Prudential and failed to comply with the 
trial court's Biscovery order by providing 
documentation of these accounts. 
[7] "[T]he judicial system is not to be 
manipulated in divorce proceedings by one 
who actively and aggressively misleads the 
court and the opposing party M Boyce v. 
Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980). Ac-
cordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in entering defendant's default.12 
12. Although the trial court may have erroneously 
entered defendant's default partially based on his 
failure to pay support arrearages, we may affirm 
based on the fact that the default was also sup-
n "^uc was iiui ui icicu, wc uu in_»i auuicaa it. 
7? State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 
^2). 
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B. Alimony Award 
[8-11] Defendant also challenges the ali-
mony award, claiming the trial court failed to 
enter the required findings. We will not 
disturb a trial court's alimony award absent a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of the considera-
ble discretion granted the trial court in de-
termining the award. BreinhoU v. BreinhoU, 
905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App.1995). It is well 
grounded in Utah law that the trial court 
must consider: " *(1) the financial conditions 
and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a 
sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the 
supporting spouse to provide support.'" 
Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah 
App.1993) (citation omitted). A trial court 
abuses its discretion when it fails to consider 
the enumerated factors. WiLley v. Wittey, 
866 F2d 547, 550 (Utah App.1993). "Thus, 
'the trial court must make sufficiently de-
tailed findings on each factor to enable a 
reviewing court to ensure that the trial 
court's discretionary determination was ra-
tionally based upon'" the required factors. 
Id (citation omitted). Accordingly, " *[i]f suf-
ficient findings are not made, we must re-
verse unless the record is clear and uncon-
troverted such as to allow us to apply the . . . 
factors as a matter of law on appeal'" Id 
(citation omitted). 
After reviewing the trial court's findings 
on alimony, we find them to be "so inade-
quate that we cannot determine the legal 
basis of the award or whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in the amount of the 
award." BeU v. BeU> 810 P2d 489,493 (Utah 
App.1991). Thus, "we reverse and remand 
ported on the basis of defendant's noncompliance 
with the discovery orders. See generally, DeBry v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (may affirm 
on any proper basis even though trial court's ruling 
was based on other ground); State ex rel. H.R.V. <fr 
BJ>.V., 906 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App.1995) (same). 
13. This notwithstanding defendant's evidentiary 
contribution to the fact finding process. 
14. We note defendant's argument that the trial 
court erred in valuing the marital property at the 
time of the parties' separation. "However, 
the alimony award for additional findings or 
each of the . . . [required] factors . . . , and i 
reassessment of the alimony award basec 
upon those findings[,]" if necessary. Id 
C. Property Division 
[12-15] Defendant argues the trial court 
abused its discretion in valuing and dividing 
the marital estate. The trial court entered 
findings regarding the value of the marital 
property, which defendant now claims are m 
error.13 However, in order to challenge a 
trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the 
challenger "must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings in question." Phillips v. Hat-
field, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n. 1 (Utah App. 
1995) (emphasis added). We will uphold the 
trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to 
appropriately marshal all of the evidence. 
Mired v. Broum, 893 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 
App.1995). Defendant has not properly mar-
shaled the evidence but has merely recited 
the findings on point and then highlighted 
the evidence which he deems contrary to the 
findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb the 
trial court's findings and affirm the awards 
on appeal.14 
D. Plaintiffs Attorney Fees 
[16,17] Defendant claims the trial court 
erred in ordering him to pay plaintiffs attoi> 
ney fees because the court failed to consider 
defendant's ability to pay and plaintiffs need 
for the award. The trial court has the au-
thority to award attorney fees in a divorce 
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
(1995). However, the decision to make such 
where one party has dissipated an asset hidden 
its value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the 
trial court may, under its broad discretion, value 
the property at an earlier date, i.e., separation." 
Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 
1987). Defendant has acted obstructively in the 
case at bar by failing to give accurate, verifiable 
accountings of his income and assets. Thus, it 
was well within the trial court's discretion tt> 
value the property at the time of the parties 
separation, as opposed to valuing the property at 
the time of trial. See Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 
P.2d 429, 432-33 (Utah App. 1994). 
MARSHALL v. 
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ID award " "must be based on evidence of the 
financial need of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees.'" Wil-
ley v. WiUey, 866 PJ2d 547, 555 (Utah App. 
1993) (quoting BeU v. BeU, 810 P.2d 489, 493 
(Utah App.1991)). The failure to consider 
any of the enumerated factors is ground for 
reversal on the fee issue. See id at 556; 
Rvdrrum v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah 
App.1991). 
The trial court entered the following find-
ing of fact regarding attorney fees: 
Plaintiffs fees and costs were submitted 
by ledger . . . to the court in the total sum 
of $25344.88. Plaintiffs attorney . . . was 
sworn and testified concerning the fees. 
He testified that his hourly charge was 
$120.00, his associate . . . $100.00, that 
those were reasonable and customary, and 
most were incurred in efforts to have De-
fendant reveal his finances. The Court 
finds under all circumstances including the 
partiesr] ability to pay and Defendant's 
demonstrated pattern of conduct, that 
Plaintiffs fees and costs are reasonable 
and necessary in full, and awards Plaintiff 
judgment for fees and costs against the 
Defendant in the sum of $25,844.88. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Although the trial court concludes that 
Pontiffs attorney fees were "necessary," 
e^re is no finding regarding plaintiffs need 
for an award of attorney fees. As a result, 
*e findings and conclusions are insufficient 
fo allow a meaningful review of the trial 
Court,s ruling, especiaUy in the face of the 
**ard of substantial marital assets. See WU-
** 866 P.2d at 555 (" We have consistently 
ei
*couraged trial courts to make findings to 
P^lain the factors which they considered 
Levant in arriving at an attorney fee 
**ard.'") (citation omitted). We therefore 
^erse the attorney fees award to plaintiff 
^ remand for the entry of further findings 
distent with this opinion. 
^8,19] Plaintiff requests attorney fees 
appeal. Generally, when fees in a divorce 
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case are granted to the prevailing party at 
the trial court, and that party in turn prevails 
on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on 
appeal. BeU v. BeU, 810 PJ2d 489, 494 (Utah 
App.1991). In this case, if the trial court 
determines that plaintiff is still entitled to 
attorney fees after considering the above 
enumerated factors, because she prevailed on 
the central issue on appeal, the entry of 
defendant's default, she shall be awarded her 
attorney fees incurred as a Tesult of this 
appeal. See id This amount shall be deter-
mined on remand. 
E. Failure to Incorporate Juvenile 
Court's Order 
[20] Lastly, defendant takes issue with 
the failure of the district court to incorporate 
into the divorce decree the juvenile court's 
order regarding custody and visitation. 
Plaintiff agrees with defendant's position to 
the effect that crucial language regarding 
joint custody and ongoing counseling was 
omitted. Accordingly, we remand the issue 
to the district court so that the order of the 
juvenile court can be incorporated into the 
divorce decree. 
CONCLUSION 
[21,22] We conclude the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in entering defen-
dant's default. As a result, the evidentiary 
hearing conducted on December 8, 1994, and 
the entry of the findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and decree of divorce were proper. 
Furthermore, because defendant did not 
marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings regarding the valuation 
and division of the marital property, this 
court will not disturb the trial court's find-
ings on appeal. We remand the issue of 
alimony for the entry of further findings. 
We also remand to the trial court for findings 
on the issue of plaintiffs need for attorney 
fees and, if appropriate, the determination of 
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plaintiffs attorney fees on appeal Lastly, 
we remand so the juvenile court's order may 
be incorporated in the divorce decree.15 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
C O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
15. Defendant also claimed that the child support 
amount was incorrect. However, after review-
ing defendant's argument, we find the trial court 
did not deviate from the child support guidelines, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp.1995), 
and accordingly, find defendant's claim to be 
without merit. Thus, we decline to discuss it on 
appeal. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 
(Utah 1992). 
We also reject defendant's argument that 
plaintiffs brief should be stricken for failure to 
comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. Finally, we reject defendant's request that 
Judge Harding be recused from the case because 
defendant failed to brief the issue on appeal. See 
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Am> 
1992). 
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care for minor child, and court found that 
Jan WATSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, husband had ability to provide support at 
that level. 
Wayne B. WATSON, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 910223-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 24, 1992. 
Final decree of divorce granting alimo-
ny, child support, visitation rights and 
property division was entered in the Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Dennis L. 
Draney, J., and husband appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Russon, J., held that (1) 
award of alimony to wife was supported by 
evidence; (2) husband failed to produce suf-
ficient evidence to challenge award of child 
support; (3) visitation award was not un-
reasonable; (4) award to wife of automo-
bile owned by husband's corporation was 
equitable; (5) award to wife of husband's 
premarital property was equitable; (6) evi-
dence supported finding with respect to 
equitable interest in marital home; (7) wife 
was entitled to costs; (8) husband was not 
entitled to new trial; and (9) wife was 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <S=>235, 286(3) 
In formulating alimony awards, trial 
court has broad discretion and its decision 
will not be overturned absent abuse of 
discretion or manifest injustice. 
2. Divorce <*»237 
In awarding alimony, trial court must 
consider financial condition and need of 
receiving spouse; ability of receiving 
spouse to produce sufficient income for him 
or herself; and ability of responding 
spouse to provide support. 
3. Divorce <*»24<K2) 
Award to wife of $2,000 per month 
alimony, reduced to $1,500 per month after 
minor child in custody of wife began 
school, was justified where parties had 
agreed that wife would remain home to 
4. Divorce <*»307, 312.5 
Husband could not successfully chal-
lenge finding with respect to child support 
calculation where he failed to marshal all 
evidence supporting court's ^finding and 
failed to demonstrate that evidence was 
insufficient to support finding. 
5. Divorce *»299 
Visitation schedule, including alternate 
weekends with return before Sunday morn-
ing church services, alternate Wednesday 
evening visits, summer vacation periods, 
and alternate holidays, was not unreason-
able to deny husband sufficient basis to 
preserve relationship with minor child, and 
was not abuse of discretion. 
6. Divorce *»252.3(1) 
Wife was entitled to award of car as 
marital asset, although car was owned by 
husband's corporation during marriage; 
corporation was to be viewed as husband's 
alter ego where husband was sole share-
holder in corporation, included corpora-
tion's automobile as personal assets on indi-
vidual financial statements, and routinely 
conducted personal business in corporate 
capacity, and recognition of corporate enti-
ty would result in inequity as wife had 
been principal operator of car during mar-
riage and husband was awarded three re-
maining automobiles used by couple. 
7. Divorce <S=>252.3(3) 
Division of marital property was eq-
uitable, although wife received certain 
household items belonging to husband be-
fore marriage, where husband received cer-
tain household items belonging to wife be-
fore marriage and ultimate property divi-
sion was fair and equitable. 
8. Divorce «»278 
Husband could not successfully chal-
lenge finding on equity interest in marital 
home where he failed to marshal evidence 
in support of finding and then demonstrate 
that, even viewing evidence in light most 
favorable to finding, evidence was insuffi-
cient to support it 
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9. Time &*M2) 
Wife was entitled to five days, exclu-
sive of intermediate Saturday and Sunday, 
to mail copy of cost memorandum to hus-
band and file copy with court, to be eligible 
for costs. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 5(bXl), 
6(a), 54(dX2). 
10. Divorce <&»192 
Wife was entitled to deposition costs 
where trial court was persuaded that depo-
sitions were taken in good faith and reason-
ably necessary to case at bar, and husband 
failed to include depositions as part of 
record, so that Court of Appeals could not 
determine whether wife could have 
achieved discovery through less expensive 
methods. Rules App.Proc., Rule ll(eX2), 
11. Divorce <*»183 
Record on husband's motion for new 
trial in divorce action failed to establish 
impropriety on part of wife's attorney, al-
though husband claimed that attorney 
caused bank to increase his monthly ban 
obligation. 
12. Divorce «=»lf4 
Wife was entitled to award of attorney 
fees on appeal where she was awarded 
attorney fees below and prevailed on ap-
peal. 
Wayne B. Watson, pro se. 
Craig M. Snyder and Leslie W. Slaugh* 
Provo, for plaintiff and appellee; 
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
AMENDE? OPINION UPON 
REHEARING1 
RUSSON, Judjre: 
Wayne Watson appeals the district 
court's decree of divorce with respect to 
alimony, child support, visitation rights and 
1. This opinion replaces the opinion of the same 
name issued July 2, 1992. The sole change is 
the addition of .section H, "Attorney Fees on 
Appeal." 
2. In the case at bar, Mr. Watson does not com-
ply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure which sets forth the appellant's brief-
ing requirements in this court Specifically, Mr. 
property division. We affirm the trial 
court's ruling, but remand for a determina-
tion of reasonable attorney fees to be 
awarded Mrs. Watson on appeal. 
I. FACTS 
The Watsons were married in Springville, 
Utah on July 28, 1984. On February 12, 
1990, Mrs. Watson filed a complaint for 
divorce, which was granted on March 18, 
1991, The parties stipulated that Mrs. 
Watson would be awarded custody of the 
minor child subject to reasonable visitation 
by Mr. Watson. Mrs. Watson was awarded 
alimony in the amount of $2000 per month 
from October 1990 through September 
1992, and $1,500 per month thereafter until 
such time as Mrs. Watson remarried, co-
habited or died. She was further awarded 
child support in the amount of $660 per 
month. The court also made an extensive 
property division between the parties. 
Mr. Watson appeals the divorce decree, 
claiming that the trial court erred: (1) in 
determining alimony; (2) in determining 
child support; (3) in determining Mr. Wat-
son's visitation rights with the minor child; 
(4) in awarding Mrs. Watson a vehicle 
owned by the corporation that employed 
Mr. Watson, as well as awarding Mrs. Wat-
son certain property owned by Mr. Watson 
prior to the marriage; (5) in computing the 
respective parties' equity in the residence 
and real property; (6) in awarding costs to 
Mrs- Watson; and (7) in denying Mr. Wat* 
son's motion for a new trial based upon 
alleged inappropriate Jtehavior of Mrs. Wat-
son's counsel. Mrs. Watson seeks attorney 
fees on appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
We address Mr. Watson's claims in the 
order outlined above.* 
Watson does not supply this court with the 
appropriate standards of review for the issues 
raised, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(5). Moreover, he 
does not include a statement of facts supported 
by citations to the record in accordance with 
Rule 24(a)(7). "We remind counsel that it is 
our prerogative to affirm the lower court deci-
sion solely on the basis of failure to comply 
with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." 
WATSON ? 
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A. Alimony 
[1,2] Mr. Watson claims that the trial 
court erred in awarding Mrs. Watson per-
manent alimony. In formulating alimony 
awards, the trial court has broad discretion, 
and its decisions will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion or manifest 
injustice. See Schindler v. Schindler, 776 
P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App.1989). In Schindler, 
this court outlined the factors to be con-
sidered by a trial court in determining ali-
mony: 
In awarding alimony, appellate courts re-
quire the trial court to consider each of 
the following three factors: (1) the finan-
cial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for 
him or herself; and (3) the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support. 
If these three factors have been con-
sidered, we will not disturb the trial 
court's alimony award unless such a seri-
ous inequity has resulted as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. The ultimate 
test of an alimony award is whether the 
party receiving alimony will be able to 
support him or herself "as nearly as pos-
sible at the standard of living . . . en-
joyed during the marriage." English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). 
Id. (citations omitted). 
[3] With respect to Mrs. Watson's fi-
nancial condition and her ability to produce 
income, the court found, based upon the 
evidence at trial, that Mrs. Watson did not 
work outside the home, and in fact, there 
was an "agreement by the parties that 
[Mrs. Watson] would not work outside the 
home but would remain in the home to care 
for the parties' minor child." Therefore, 
the court "decline[d] to impute any income 
to the plaintiff, at least until the child is in 
school on a full time basis." With respect 
to Mr. Watson's ability to provide support, 
the court found, based on the parties' tax 
returns from 1986 to 1990, that Mr. Watson 
had an average gross income of $93,668.75. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 ?2d 
1311, 1313 n. 1 (Utah App.1991) (citations omit-
ted). However, we decline, in this instance, to 
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Accordingly, the court entered the follow-
ing finding: 
Based upon [Mr. Watson's] ability to 
earn, and the needs of [Mrs. Watson], 
the Court awards alimony to [Mrs. Wat-
son] in the amount of $2000.00 per 
month, beginning with the month of Oc-
tober 1990, through and including the 
month of September 1992. Said alimony 
payments may be paid in two equal 
monthly installments of $1000.00 each 
due on the 5th and 20th days of October, 
1990 and continuing thereafter through 
and including September of 1992, when 
the parties' minor child is scheduled to 
become enrolled in school on a full time 
basis. 
Beginning with the month of October, 
1992, [Mrs. Watson's] alimony award 
shall be reduced to the sum of $1,500.00 
per month 
Said alimony payments shall continue 
until such time as the plaintiff remarries, 
dies or cohabits as defined by statute, or 
until further order of the court 
(Emphasis added.) 
The trial court's written findings demon-
strate that the court considered the factors 
set out in Schindler, and those findings are 
supported by the evidence. Therefore, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in determining the alimony 
award. 
B. Child Support 
[4] Mr. Watson argues that the trial 
court erred in calculating the child support 
award. In reviewing child support awards, 
"we accord substantial deference to the 
trial court's findings and give it considera-
ble latitude in fashioning the appropriate 
relief." Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 
393, 394 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). 
"We will not disturb that court's actions 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
to the contrary or there has been an abuse 
of discretion." Id 
exercise our discretion to affirm solely on the 
basis that Mr. Watson failed to comply with 
Rule 24(a)(5) and (7). See id. 
837 P.26—2 
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Specifically, Mr. Watson argues that the 
trial court failed to offset his child support 
obligation by the amount that he pays in 
medical and dental premiums for the minor 
child, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45-7.7(2Xb) (1992), which directs the trial 
court to: 
Calculate each parent's proportionate 
share of the base combined child support 
obligation by multiplying the combined 
child support obligation by each parent's 
percentage of combined adjusted gross 
income, and subtracting from the prod-
ucts the children's portion of any month-
ly payments made directly by each par-
ent for medical and dental insurance pre-
miums. 
To mount a successful challenge to the 
trial court's finding with respect to the 
child support calculation, Mr. Watson is 
required to marshal all the evidence sup-
porting the court's finding and demon-
strate that the evidence is insufficient to 
support that finding. See Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Mr. Watson fails to satisfy that burden in 
the present case. Therefore, we assume 
the record supports the finding, Crouse v. 
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App.1991), 
and conclude that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in setting the child 
support award. 
C. Visitation 
[5] Mr. Watson argues the trial court 
erred in determining his visitation rights 
with the minor child. Specifically, he con-
tends that the court improperly restricted 
his "normal" visitation rights by ordering 
that he return the minor child to Mrs. Wat-
son one-half hour prior to church services 
at the conclusion of his alternating week-
end visitation. 
"In determining visitation rights, the tri-
al court must 'give the highest priority to 
the welfare of the children over the desires 
of the parent'" Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 
P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah App.1987), cert de-
nied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 
1980)). Accordingly, we will disturb the 
trial court's visitation determination only 
upon a showing that the trial court has 
abused its discretion. See Moon v. Moon, 
790 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah App.1990); Eb-
bert, 744 P.2d at 1023. 
We have previously noted that the trial 
court's visitation schedule "should be real-
istic and reasonable and provide an ade-
quate basis for preserving and fostering 
the child's relationship with the noncustodi-
al parent" Ebbert, 744 P.2d at 1022. In 
the present case, the trial court awarded 
Mr. Watson the following visitation with 
the minor child: 
(a) Alternating weekends from Friday 
at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday morning thirty 
minutes prior to the start of plaintiffs 
church meeting. 
(b) During the week that the defen-
dant does not have weekend visitation, 
Wednesday evening from 5:30 p.m. until 
8:30 p.m. 
(c) Christmas holiday beginning each 
Christmas day from 1:00 p.m. for one 
half of the total Christmas holiday vaca-
tion period. 
(d) One two-week period and one one-
week period during each summer vaca-
tion period. 
(e) Father's Day. 
(f) Alternate state and national holi-
days, except for Christmas Day which is 
dealt with separately hereinabove. 
Mr. Watson does not demonstrate that 
the foregoing visitation schedule is unrea-
sonable as to deny him a sufficient basis to 
preserve his relationship with the minor 
child. Further, the court's order which re-
quires Mr. Watson to return the child so 
that he may attend his regular church 
meetings is not so unreasonable as to 
amount to an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court Therefore, we conclude that 
the district court did not err in determining 
Mr. Watson's visitation rights. 
D. Property Division 
Mr. Watson claims that the trial court 
erred in awarding Mrs. Watson the 1985 
BMW automobile which was owned by the 
corporation that employed him. He fur-
ther claims that the trial court erred in 
WATSON 
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awarding Mrs. Watson certain personal 
property that was his premarital property. 
'There is no fixed formula upon which to 
determine a division of properties in a di-
vorce action[.]" Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 
P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App.1988) (citation 
omitted). We afford the trial court "con-
siderable latitude in adjusting financial and 
property interests, and its actions are enti-
tled to a presumption of validity." Id. (ci-
tation omitted). Accordingly, changes will 
be made in a trial court's property division 
determination in a divorce action "only if 
there was a misunderstanding or misappli-
cation of the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings, or such 
a serious inequity has resulted as to mani-
fest a clear abuse of discretion." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). 
1. Corporate Property 
[6] Mr. Watson claims that the trial 
court erred in awarding Mrs. Watson the 
BMW automobile on the ground that it was 
not subject to marital distribution because 
it was a non-marital asset owned by the 
corporation that employed him. Mrs. Wat-
son responds that the unity of interest be-
tween Mr. Watson and his solely owned 
corporation requires that the latter be 
viewed as the alter ego of the former for 
purposes of this action. We agree. 
In Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 
(Utah App.1987), we set out the require-
ments for setting aside a corporate entity 
under the alter ego doctrine. 
To disregard the corporate entity un-
der the equitable alter ego doctrine, two 
circumstances must be shown: (1) Such a 
unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, but 
the corporation is, instead, the alter ego 
of one or a few individuals; and (2) if 
observed, the corporate form would sanc-
tion a fraud, promote injustice, or result 
in an inequity. 
Id at 786 (citations omitted). 
The record in this case demonstrates that 
the two requirements set forth in Colman 
are satisfied. First, there was a unity of 
v. WATSON Utah 5 
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interest between Mr. Watson and the pro-
fessional corporation that employed him. 
Mr. Watson was the sole shareholder in the 
corporation and regularly purchased auto-
mobiles in his corporate name for the cou-
ple's personal use. Further, Mr. Watson 
included the corporation's automobiles as 
personal assets on his individual financial 
statements. Finally, there was substantial 
evidence at trial that Mr. Watson routinely 
conducted personal business in his corpo-
rate capacity. Therefore, the first prong 
under Colman is satisfied. 
Second, recognition of the corporate enti-
ty would result in an inequity in the case at 
bar. The record demonstrates that the 
BMW was purchased during the couple's 
marriage, that Mrs. Watson had been the 
principle operator of the BMW during the 
marriage, and that the trial court awarded 
the three remaining automobiles used by 
the Watsons to Mr. Watson. Based on 
those facts, an inequity would result since 
Mr. Watson, or the corporation in which he 
is the sole shareholder, would be awarded 
all of the automobiles possessed by Mr. and 
Mrs. Watson during their marriage. Thus, 
we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that the 
automobile was subject to equitable distri-
bution in this action. 
2. Premarital Property 
[7] Mr. Watson argues that the trial 
court erred in awarding his premarital 
property to Mrs. Watson. Specifically, he 
challenges the award of certain household 
furniture, garden tools, a washer and 
dryer, and his premarital contribution to 
the couple's Nomad trailer. 
"Premarital property, gifts, and inheri-
tances may be viewed as separate property, 
and in appropriate circumstances, equity 
will require that each party retain the sepa-
rate property brought to the marriage. 
However, the rule is not invariable." 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 
1987) (footnotes omitted). 
In appropriate circumstances, one 
spouse may be awarded property which 
the other spouse brought in to the mar-
riage. The rationale behind this excep-
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tion to the general rule is that "[m|arital 
property 'encompasses all of the assets 
of every nature possessed by the parties, 
whenever obtained and from whatever 
source derived/ " Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
769 P.2d 820, 824 (Utah App.1989) (quot-
ing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 
1078 (Utah 1988)), and that the trial court 
may, in the exercise of its broad discre-
tion, divide the property equitably re-
gardless of its source or time of acquisi-
tion. 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 
n. 1 (Utah App.1990) (citations omitted). 
Additionally, we have held that in dividing 
property between parties in a divorce ac-
tion, "[t]he overriding consideration is that 
the ultimate division be equitablef.]" Burt 
v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 
1990) (quoting Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 
745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987)). 
In the present case, the trial court made 
a detailed property division between the 
parties that spans approximately six pages. 
In challenging the court's findings, Mr. 
Watson does not challenge the equity of 
the division, but only challenges the propri-
ety of including his individual premarital 
items in the property division. Specifically, 
Mr. Watson challenges the court's award 
of certain household furniture, garden 
tools, and a washer and dryer to Mrs. Wat-
son. However, Mr. Watson disregards the 
fact that the trial court, pursuant to its 
equitable powers, also awarded to him cer-
tain premarital property belonging to Mrs. 
Watson, including a microwave oven, an 
iron, and a vacuum. Accordingly, because 
the court's Ultimate property division was 
fair and equitable, we determine that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
including certain premarital property of 
each party in its distribution. 
Further, Mr. Watson contends that the 
trial court erred in awarding the Nomad 
trailer to Mrs. Watson because the trial 
court failed to consider his premarital con-
tribution to the purchase of the trailer m 
arriving at its ultimate division. However, 
Mr. Watson cites no evidence whatsoever 
to support this allegation. Moreover, there 
was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to 
support the trial court's finding that the 
Nomad trailer was marital property subject 
to equitable distribution between the par-
ties. Therefore, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding the Nomad 
Trailer to Mrs. Watson. 
E. Equity Interest In Home 
[8] Mr. Watson challenges the trial 
court's finding with respect to the amount 
of his equity interest in the parties' home. 
Specifically, he claims that the trial court, 
in its calculation, did not consider his con-
tribution of $60,549 that he withdrew from 
his retirement account and secured with a 
third mortgage on the home. Mrs. Watson 
responds that the money withdrawn from 
the retirement account was not used for 
construction of the home, and that there-
fore she should not be held responsible for 
any portion of the obligation under the 
third mortgage. The court found: 
Defendant claims, but has not shown, 
that he withdrew funds from his retire-
ment account and the proceeds of the 
third mortgage referred to above went 
into the house, but defendant has made 
no showing that such is the case, and the 
court determines that the plaintiff should 
not be held responsible for the third 
mortgage to which she did not agree. 
"Findings of fact . . . shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due re-
gard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). More-
over, we have held: 
To mount a successful attack on the 
trial court's factual findings, an appel-
lant must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that, even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to 
the findings, the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings, Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), 
or that its findings are otherwise clearly 
erroneous. A finding is clearly errone-
ous, when, even though there is evidence 
to support it, the reviewing court is "left 
with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed." State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 198 (Utah 1987). 
WATSON v, 
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Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 
(Utah App.1989). 
Not only has Mr. Watson failed to mar-
shal the evidence in support of the above 
finding and then demonstrate that, even 
viewing the evidence in the light most fa-
vorable to the finding, the evidence is in-
sufficient to support it, but Mr. Watson 
erroneously claims that the uncontroverted 
testimony before the trial court was that 
he used the funds from his retirement ac-
count to construct the parties' home. In 
fact, Mrs. Watson testified before the court 
that Mr. Watson did not use money from 
his pension account for construction of the 
home. Therefore, since there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the court's find-
ing, we conclude that the finding was not 
clearly erroneous. 
F. Costs 
[9] Mr. Watson argues that the trial 
court erred in awarding costs to Mrs. Wat-
son. "We review the trial court's award of 
costs under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard." Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 
686 (Utah App.1990) (citing Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980); 
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mar-
keting, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 
1988)). 
Specifically, Mr. Watson argues that 
costs were improperly awarded since Mrs. 
Watson failed to comply with Rule 54(dX2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He 
further argues that the trial court erred in 
awarding deposition costs to Mrs. Watson. 
The pertinent portion of Rule 54(dX2) 
states: 
The party who claims his costs must 
within five days after the entry of judg-
ment serve upon the adverse party 
against whom costs are claimed, a copy 
of a memorandum of the items of his 
costs and necessary disbursements in the 
action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stat-
3. The pertinent portion of Rule 5(b)(1) provides: 
Whenever under these rules service is re-
quired or permitted to be made upon a party 
represented by an attorney the service shall 
be made upon the attorney unless service 
upon the party himself is ordered by the 
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ing that to affiant's knowledge the items 
are correct, and that the disbursements 
have been necessarily incurred in the ac-
tion or proceeding. 
The record in this case reflects that Mrs. 
Watson complied with the terms of Rule 
54(d)(2). Under that rule, Mrs. Watson had 
five days after entry of judgment within 
which to serve a copy of the memorandum 
of costs upon Mr. Watson, and file a veri-
fied memorandum with the court How-
ever, Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that "[w]hen the period 
of time prescribed or allowed is less than 
seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded in 
the computation." Accordingly, Mrs. Wat-
son had five days after March 20, 1991, the 
day judgment was entered, exclusive of the 
intermediate Saturday and Sunday, to com-
ply with Rule 54(d)(2). Mrs. Watson mailed 
a copy of the memorandum to Mr. Wat-
son's attorney, as per Rule 5(bXl) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,8 and filed a 
verified memorandum with the court on 
March 26, 1990, which date was within the 
prescribed time limit. Therefore, Mrs. 
Watson complied with rule 54(d)(2), and is 
not barred from costs under that rule. 
[10] Mr. Watson further challenges the 
award of deposition costs. Costs of deposi-
tions are not recoverable unless "the trial 
court is persuaded that they were taken in 
good faith and, in the light of the circum-
stances, appeared to be essential for the 
development and presentation of the case." 
Morgan, 795 P.2d at 687 (quoting Framp-
ton, 605 P.2d at 774) (citation omitted). In 
Morgan, we further provided that: 
[T]he party seeking the cost of deposition 
bears the burden of proving that the 
depositions were reasonably necessary. 
Depositions are reasonably necessary 
only where the complex nature of the 
case prevents a party from completing 
discovery through less expensive meth-
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a 
party shall be made by delivering a copy to 
him or by mailing it to him at his known 
address 
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ods such as interrogatories, requests for 
admissions, and requests for the produc-
tion of documents. 
Id (citation omitted). 
The trial court was persuaded that the 
depositions were taken in good faith and 
reasonably necessary to the case at bar. 
In ruling on Mr. Watson's Motion to Strike 
Costs, the court specifically found that "the 
costs set forth [in Mrs. Watson's Memoran-
dum of Costs] were reasonable and neces-
sary for development and presentation of 
the case." Further, because Mr. Watson 
failed to include the depositions as part of 
the record pursuant to Rule ll(eX2) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,4 we 
must presume that the trial court's finding 
that Mrs. Watson's costs were reasonable 
and necessary was supported by the evi-
dence. See Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 
998, 1002 (Utah App.), cert denied, 776 
P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Finally, without the 
depositions as a point of reference, this 
court cannot determine whether Mrs. Wat-
son could have achieved discovery through 
less expensive methods such as interroga-
tories, requests for admissions, and re-
quests for the production of documents. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in award-
ing costs to Mrs. Watson. 
G. Motion For New Trial 
[11] Lastly, Mr. Watson argues that 
the trial court erred in denying his motion 
for a new trial. Specifically, he contends 
that the trial court should have ordered a 
new trial because Mrs. Watson's, attorney 
caused Mr. Watson's lender, Wasatch 
Bank, to increase his monthly loan obli-
gation by fourfold. "In reviewing a court's 
denial of a motion for a new trial, the 
ruling on such a motion will be disturbed 
on appeal 'only for an abuse of discre-
tion.' " Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 
74T (Utah App.1991) (quoting Erickson v. 
Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323, 1326 
(Utah App.1990)) (citation omitted). 
4. Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal 
that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by 
Mr. Watson's argument is without merit 
In an affidavit filed with the district court, 
Vera Bailey, Executive Vice President of 
Wasatch Bank, stated that "Mr. Watson's 
loan account with Wasatch Bank was treat-
ed no differently than any other delinquent 
loan account." In support of the bank's 
treatment of Mr. Watson's loan account, 
Mr. Bailey cited the following factors: 
(a) The fact that the loan was unse-
cured and had been renewed on three 
previous occasions and had never been 
paid in full and was now delinquent; 
(b) The fact that Mr. Watson did not 
respond to the bank's collection efforts 
until the loan became seriously past due; 
(c) The fact that the Watsons' domes-
tic problems were common knowledge 
and in many divorces there are often 
negative financial problems resulting 
from divorce; and 
(d) On October 12, 1990, Mr. Watson 
informed [Mr. Bailey] that he had with-
drawn his major deposits from Wasatch 
Bank. 
Since Mr. Watson does not establish any 
impropriety on the part of Mrs. Watson's 
attorney, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying his motion for a new 
trial. 
H. Attorney Pees On Appeal 
[12] Mrs. Watson seeks an award of 
attorney fees on appeal. "Ordinarily, when 
fees in a divorce have been awarded below 
to the party who then prevails on appeal, 
fees will also be awarded to that party on 
appeal/' Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 
(Utah App.1991) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.1990)). In the 
case at bar, Mrs. Watson was awarded 
attorney fees below and has prevailed on 
appeal. Further, Mr. Watson has not dem-
onstrated why we should diverge from the 
general rule; therefore, we award Mrs. 
Watson reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to such finding or conclu-
sion. , 
m. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court did not err in: (1) de-
termining Mrs. Watson's alimony award; 
(2) determining the child support award; (3) 
determining Mr. Watson's visitation rights; 
(4) awarding Mrs. Watson the 1985 BMW 
and certain premarital property owned by 
Mr. Watson; (5) computing the parties' re-
spective equity in the home; (6) awarding 
costs to Mrs. Watson; and (7) denying Mr. 
Watson's motion for a new trial. Addition-
ally, we award Mrs. Watson attorney fees 
on appeal in an amount to be determined 
by the trial court on remand. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
f O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM/ 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Pamela Malan HIGGINS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 910622-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 25, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted on guilty 
plea in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Pat B. Brian, J., of attempted pos-
session of controlled substance. Defen-
dant appealed denial of her motion to sup-
press evidence. The Court of Appeals, 
Russon, J., held that defendant was not 
unreasonably seized for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes, and evidence obtained in 
search incident to her arrest was admissi-
ble. 
Affirmed. 
Jackson, J., dissented. 
HIGGINS Utah 9 
(UtahApp. 1992) 
1. Arrest <*=*8<4) 
Stopping of automobile and consequent 
detention of its occupants constitute a "sei-
zure" within the Fourth Amendment even 
though the purpose of stop is limited and 
resulting detention quite brief. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Arrest *»58 
Fourth Amendment prohibits only un-
reasonable seizures. U.S.CA. Const 
Amend. 4. 
3. Arrest *»63.4(1) 
To determine whether seizure is rea-
sonable, court must determine whether po-
lice officer's action was justified at its in-
ception, and whether officer's action was 
reasonably related in scope to circum-
stances which justified interference in first 
place. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Arrest «=»63.5(6) 
Stopping of automobile if constitution-
ally justified if stop is based upon reason-
able and articulable suspicion that occupant 
of automobile has committed or is about to 
commit a crime. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Arrest *=»63.5(6) 
Stop of automobile was constitutional-
ly justified where automobile matched de-
scription of vehicle suspected in reported 
gas theft at nearby convenience store. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Arrest «=>63.5(9) 
Length and scope of detention pursu-
ant to stop of automobile must be strictly 
tied to and justified by circumstances 
which rendered initiation of detention per-
missible. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
7. Arrest <8=»63.5(6, 9) 
Defendant was not unreasonably 
seized pursuant to initial stop of automo-
bile in which she was passenger, where 
police officers stopped automobile to ques-
tion driver about gas theft and did not ask 
defendant any questions, demand to see 
her identification, or restrict her liberty in 
any way. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4. 
8. Arrest <*=»68(4) 
Defendant was not seized when police 
officers approached her to ask if she would 
BREINHOLT v. BREINHOLT 
Cite at 905 TM 877 (UtahApp. 1995) 
ZIMMERMAN, CJ., STEWART, 
^Associate C.J., HOWE, J., and DURHAM, 
jk concur in RUSSON, J., opinion. 
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3. Divorce <&»286(6.1) 
If Court of Appeals reviews trial court's 
findings of fact with respect to alimony 
awards, Court will reverse only if findings 
are clearly erroneous. 
Steven Neil BREINHOLT, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Jan £. BREINHOLT, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 940395-CA 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 26, 1995. 
In divorce proceeding, the Seventh Dis-
trict Court, Carbon County, Lyle R. 
Anderson, J., granted divorce and awarded 
child support and alimony to wife. Wife 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davis, As-
sociate P.J., held that: (1) trial court failed to 
enter sufficient findings of fact regarding 
Parties' financial needs and failed to consider 
husband's income from his second job and 
Parties' unearned income when calculating 
alimony award; (2) sufficient findings of fact 
*
egarding necessary business expenses were 
*
e(juired to determine child support; and (3) 
Valuation of business was not warranted. 
Reversed and remanded in part, and 
affirmed in part. 
1
 Divorce <S=»235, 286(3.1) 
, Trial courts have considerable discretion 
* determining alimony and will be upheld on 
T>Peal unless clear and prejudicial abuse of 
a,8cretion is demonstrated. 
*• Divorce @»286(1) 
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's 
^clugiou of law with respect to alimony 
^s^ds for correctness, according no defer-
*** to trial court. 
4. Divorce «»237 
When determining alimony, trial court 
must consider financial conditions and needs 
of receiving spouse, ability of receiving 
spouse to support him or herself, and ability 
of payor spouse to provide .support 
5. Divorce =^>237 
When determining alimony, payor 
spouse's ability to provide support depends 
on payor spouse's reasonable financial needs. 
6. Divorce <&»239, 286(6.1) 
When determining alimony, trial court is 
required to enter sufficient findings on finan-
cial conditions and needs of receiving spouse, 
ability of receiving spouse to support himself 
and ability of payor spouse to provide sup-
port; if it fails to do so, Court of Appeals will 
reverse unless relevant facts contained with-
in record are clear, uncontroverted, and ca-
pable of supporting only finding in favor of 
judgment. 
7. Divorce <S=>239 
When determining propriety of alimony, 
trial court should have entered findings re-
garding each party's financial needs and the 
reasonableness of each party's monthly ex-
penses, as well as any personal expenditures 
paid by payor spouse's business, since assess-
ment of financial need was required to assess 
payor spouse's ability to provide support 
8. Divorce <£»240(2) 
Trial court was required to consider in-
come from husband's second job in its alimo-
ny calculations, even though he was appoint-
ed to that position only six months before 
parties separated. 
9. Divorce @=»240(2) 
Trial court must consider both parties' 
unearned income when fashioning alimony 
award, since it affects payor spouse's ability 
to provide support, as well as receiving 
spouse's need. 
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10. Divorce <3=>286(2) 
Trial court is afforded considerable dis-
cretion in adjusting financial interests of di-
vorced parties and court's actions are enti-
tled to presumption of validity. 
11. Parent and Child @=>3.3(10) 
Court of Appeals will not reverse child 
support determination absent manifest injus-
tice or inequity that indicates clear abuse of 
discretion. 
12. Parent and Child @=>3.3(10) 
Trial court is required to enter detailed 
and specific findings on all material issues 
which must be considered when making child 
support award; if it fails to do so, Court of 
Appeals will reverse unless facts in record 
are clear, uncontroverted and capable of sup-
porting only finding in favor of judgment 
13. Parent and Child ^3.3(6) 
When determining child support, find-
ings are adequate if they are sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which ultimate con-
clusion on each factual issue was reached. 
14. Parent and Child e»3.3(7) 
Although trial court is accorded discre-
tion in calculating self-employed spouse's 
gross income for child support purposes, 
court must consider which expenses are nec-
essary in order to make child support deter-
mination. U.CJU953, 78-45-7.5(4)(a). 
15. Parent and Child e=>3.3(6, 10) 
Specific and detailed findings of fact as 
to which expenses from self-employment are 
necessary to spouse are required when deter-
mining child support, so that Court of Ap-
peals can ensure that trial court's calculation 
of payor spouse's gross income is rationally 
based. U.OA.1953, 7&-4&-7.5(4)(a). 
16. Divorce «=»286(2) 
Trial court's actions in divorce proceed-
ing regarding parties' property interests are 
entitled to presumption of validity. 
17. Divorce <s=>286(5) 
Trial court's valuation of marital proper-
ty will not be disturbed absent clear abuse of 
discretion. 
18. Divorce <3=*184(10) 
When challenging trial court's finding., 
of fact in divorce proceeding, party
 mugt 
marshall all evidence supporting trial comf
 g 
findings and then show evidence to be legally 
insufficient to support findings; if party chaj. 
lenging finding fails to marshall supporting 
evidence, trial court's finding will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. 
19. Divorce <s=>307 
Substantial evidence was presented to 
trial court supporting its finding, in making 
child support determination, regarding value 
of father's business, and mother, in challeng-
ing those findings, failed to marshal support-
ing evidence and demonstrate that it was 
unsupportive of trial court's finding. 
L.G. Cutler, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Joanne Pappas White, Price, for Appellee. 
Before DAVIS, Associate P.J., and 
GREENWOOD and WILKINS, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Jan E. Breinholt appeals from a 
final decree of divorce entered on June 14, 
1994. We reverse and remand in part, and 
affirm in part 
I. FACTS 
The parties were married in 1977. Shortly 
after their marriage, defendant went to work 
for a finance company in Price, Utah, earning 
approximately $3.50 per hour. Defendant 
subsequently obtained a position as a recep-
tionist for a coal company making $650 per 
month. Six months later defendant trans-
ferred to a different department within the 
company and increased her gross monthly 
income to $1200. Defendant left the employ 
of the coal company in November 1981 to 
give birth to the parties, first child. 
At the time of their marriage, plaintiff was 
working for a cement company earning ap-
proximately $42,000 annually and enjoying 
the use of a company car. Plaintiff left the 
BREINHOLT v. 
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cement company in February 1985 to begin a 
family business by the name of Breinholt 
Music (the business). Both parties worked 
exclusively at the business until the birth of 
their second child, when defendant stayed 
home to care for the parties' two children. 
Thus, defendant has not worked outside the 
home since late 1988. In February 1992, 
plaintiff was appointed as a county commis-
sioner for Carbon County, earning approxi-
mately $21,000 annually,1 which was in addi-
tion to the income drawn from the business. 
The parties separated in November 1992, 
aid plaintiff filed for divorce in July of 1993. 
A trial was held on March 7, April 14, and 
April 15,1994. The parties primarily disput-
ed the valuation of and income from the 
business, which affected the property distri-
bution and the calculation of child support 
and alimony. 
Both parties presented extensive expert 
testimony on both issues. Although the ex-
perts agreed for the most part on the valua-
tion method, their opinions regarding the 
value of the business diverged greatly; plain-
tiffs expert valued it at $118,000, and defen-
dant's expert valued it as high as $180,000. 
The principal difference between the valua-
tions arose due to the amount of personal 
expenses each expert determined should be 
added back into the business profits and a 
reasonable salary for plaintiffs services.2 
After considering "both appraisals, the eco-
nomic conditions in the area and the costs of 
replacing the business," the trial court found 
that the business was worth approximately 
$100,000. Although the trial court specifical-
ly declined to address the issue of the per-
sonal "expenses aggressively deducted by the 
[parties] on their income tax returns[,]" the 
court stated that it "considered all of the 
evidence on that issue" in determining the 
business's value. 
Defendant appeals the trial court's valua-
tion of the business, child support, and alimo-
ny awards. 
II. ISSUES 
Defendant raises several issues on appeal: 
(1) Was the trial court's alimony award an 
*• Plaintiff was elected to a full tenn in November 
1994. 
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abuse of discretion? (2) Did the trial court 
err by failing to determine what expenses 
were necessary for the operation of the fami-
ly business for child support purposes? and 
(3) Did the trial court err in finding that the 
value of the business was $100,000? 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Alimony 
[1-3] "Trial courts have considerable dis-
cretion in determining alimony . . . and will 
be upheld on appeal unless a clear and preju-
dicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." 
HvweU v. HowelL 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 
App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
We review a trial court's conclusion of law 
with respect to alimony awards for correct-
ness, according no deference to the trial 
court. Id If, however, we are charged with 
the task of reviewing the trial court's find-
ings of fact, we will reverse only if the find-
ings are clearly erroneous. Id 
Defendant takes issue with the trial court's 
alimony award, claiming that the trial court 
erred by (1) failing to enter appropriate find-
ings of fact supporting the award and (2) 
refusing to consider plaintiffs unearned in-
come and income from his second job in its 
alimony calculation. We address each claim 
in turn. 
1. Failure to Enter Sufficient Findings of 
Fact 
[4-6] Defendant argues that the trial 
court abused its discretion in fashioning the 
alimony award because it failed to enter suf-
ficient findings regarding the parties' finan-
cial needs. It is well established that the 
" function of alimony is to provide support 
for the [receiving spouse] as nearly as possi-
ble at the standard of living [he or] she 
enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the 
[receiving spouse] from becoming a public 
charge.'" Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1075 (Utah 1985) (quoting English v. En-
glish, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). To 
attain these goals, the trial court must con-
2. Defendant's expert also had a mathematical 
error of $7300 in his calculations. 
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sider (1) the financial conditions and needs of 
the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the 
receiving spouse to support him or herself; 
and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support Id. An underlying factor 
regarding the payor spouse's ability to pro-
vide support is the payor spouse's financial 
need. "[T]he payor spouse's reasonable 
needs are a necessary subsidiary step in 
determining the ability to provide support." 
WiUey v. WMey, 866 P.2d 547, 551 & n. 1 
(Utah App.1993). The trial court is required 
to enter sufficient findings on the three enu-
merated factors, and we will reverse if it fails 
to do so unless the relevant facts contained 
within the record are " 'clear, incontrovert-
ed, and capable of supporting only a finding 
in favor of the judgment'" Howell, 806 P.2d 
at 1213 (quoting Andersen v. Andersen, 757 
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah App.1988)). 
[7] In the case at bar, the trial court 
made no findings of defendant's financial 
needs as required, nor did it make findings of 
plaintiffs financial needs, an "underlying fac-
tual determination . . . required for an as-
sessment" of plaintiffs ability to provide sup-
port WiUeyi 866 P.2d at 551. Although 
each party testified regarding their monthly 
expenses, the trial court did not enter find-
ings regarding the reasonableness of the ex-
penses. Based on this failure, "we remand 
for findings on each party's reasonable needs 
so we can determine if the court abused its 
discretion in setting the amount . . . of the 
alimony award." Id. 
We note that because the court must enter 
findings on plaintiffs fmftT*<*ifll needs and 
ability to pay support, this necessarily re-
quires findings regarding plaintiffs personal 
expenses, if any, paid by the business. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that when 
determining a self-employed payor spouse's 
ability to provide support, the trial court 
must examine "[tjhe full profit produced by 
the business, adjusted by the court to take 
into account legitimate and reasonable needs 
of the business." Janes, 700 P.2d at 1076 
(emphasis added). In the case at bar, there 
was substantial evidence before the trial 
court that the parties expensed personal 
items through the business. Thus, determin-
ing which personal expenses plaintiff deducts 
from business profits is essential for a <*• 
rect representation of plaintiffs ability ^ 
provide support. If plaintiff expenses 
large amount of personal items from th 
business, this will have the effect of lowerm* 
the business's profitability and, hence, p l ^ 
tiffs ability to provide support. Thus, the 
personal expenditures must be added back 
into the business profits, providing the court 
with a truer picture of plaintiffs finance 
abilities and augmenting plaintiffs ability to 
provide defendant with alimony support 
2. Failure to Consider Unearned Income 
and Income From Second Job 
The trial court refused to consider plain, 
tiffs unearned income and income from his 
second job in fashioning the alimony award 
stating in its findings of fact: 
18. . . . Since marital assets were divided 
equally and neither party has substantial 
non-marital property, the court finds that 
investment "unearned" income is pre-
sumed to be equal, insubstantial in com-
parison with "earned" income and, there-
fore, excluded from the alimony calcula-
tions. 
19. . . . Utah law is clear that the Court 
should consider only the income from the 
equivalent of one (I) full-time job in setting 
child support, § 78-46-7.5(2) Utah Code 
Annotated (1993). This Court believes 
that the policy behind that rule applies 
with even greater force when considering 
the issue of alimony. Accordingly, the 
Court did not consider Plaintiffs earnings 
from his second job in setting alimony. 
The trial court's statement of the law re-
garding income from plaintiffs second job 
and unearned income is incorrect as it ap-
plies to the issue of alimony. This court has 
previously held that when determining an 
alimony award, "it is appropriate and neces-
sary for a trial court to consider all sources 
of income that were used by the parties 
during their marriage to meet their self-
defined needs, from whatever source—over-
time, second joby self-employment, etc^  as 
well as unearned income." Crompton * 
Crompton, 888 P.2d 686,690 (Utah App.1994) 
(emphasis added). See also Paffd v. Paffi 
732 P.2d 96, 102 (Utah 1986) (holding trial 
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grort did not abuse its discretion by consid-
ering payor's spouse's income in determining 
payor's ability to pay alimony); Yeldermanv. 
jgdderman, 669 P^d 406, 409 (Utah 1983) 
•gcourt considered income sources in addition 
to employment income in determining alimo-
ny); Osguthorpe v. Osgvthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 
m (Utah App.1990) (same); Ruksam v. 
Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 125-26 (Utah App. 
4987) (holding that retirement and disability 
jjay properly considered in addition to em-
fioyment income in determining alimony). 
(8] Not only does the law require that 
Hie trial court consider plaintifPs income 
from a second job, but plaintiff also testified 
that the parties used the county commission 
income to pay household expenses.3 This 
fact supports our conclusion that the income 
must be considered in the alimony calcula-
tions. 
[9] Additionally, unearned income must 
be considered by the trial court when fash-
ioning the alimony award. The third Jones 
factor IB the ability of the supporting spouse 
to provide support. 700 P.2d at 1075. The 
trial court found that each party had approxi-
mately $6000 per year in unearned income.4 
The trial court felt that this amount was 
insignificant and, in any event, a wash. We 
disagree and conclude that it affects plain-
tiff's ability to provide support as well as 
defendant's need and, accordingly, must be 
considered by the trial court5 
While consideration of the additional in-
come may or may not result in an adjustment 
°f the award, we hold the trial court abused 
its discretion by refusing to consider plain-
tiffs income from his county commission job 
^d the parties' unearned income in calculat-
^g the alimony award. On remand, we in-
^nict the court to take these additional 
*• Plaintiff claims that his income as county com-
missioner was not part of the family's historical 
earnings because he was appointed to the com-
mission only six months before the parties sepa-
rated, and therefore the income should not be 
considered on that basis. However, this court 
has held that when calculating alimony, the trial 
court should look at the standard of living which 
exists at the time of trial. Howell v. Howell, 806 
p
-2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 
p
-2d 327 (Utah 1991). This exercise is "consis-
tent with the goal of equalizing the parties' post 
divorce status." Id. 
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items of income into consideration when de-
termining whether the .amount of alimony 
awarded was correct 
B. Child Support Determination 
Defendant next assigns error to the trial 
court's failure to enter findings of fact re-
garding the necessary business expenses 
when it calculated plaintifPs gross income for 
child support purposes. 
[10-13] A trial court is accorded "consid-
erable discretion in adjusting the financial 
interests of divorced parties and, thus, the 
court's "actions are entitled to a presumption 
of validity.'" AUred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 
1111 (Utah App.1990) (quoting Hansen v. 
Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.), 
cert denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)). We 
will not reverse a child support determina-
tion "absent 'manifest injustice or inequity 
that indicates a clear abuse of . . . discre-
tion;" Jensen v. Botucut, 892 P.2d 1053, 
1055 (Utah App.) (quoting Hansen, 736 P.2d 
at 1056, cert denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 
1995)). Additionally, a trial court is required 
to enter detailed and specific findings on all 
material issues "which must be considered 
when making a child support award." AU-
red, 797 P.2d at 1111. If it fails to do so, we 
will reverse " "unless the facts in the record 
are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment,"'" Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 
909, 911 (Utah App.1988) (quoting Acton u 
J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) 
(citation omitted)). Findings are adequate if 
they are ""sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps 
by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached; " Stevens v. Ste-
4. Although the trial court did not support this 
amount with sufficient evidentiary findings, nei-
ther party disputes the amount. 
5. The fact that plaintiff has $6000 in additional 
annual income does not necessarily mean defen-
dant is entitled to additional alimony. Converse-
ly, the fact that $6000 of defendant's needs are 
satisfied does not necessarily mean that alimony 
will be reduced by that amount. 
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vens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah App.1988) 
(quoting Acton, 737 P.2d at 999). 
[14,15] In the case at bar, plaintiff is 
self-employed. Accordingly, his gross in-
come for child support purposes is calculated 
by "subtracting necessary expenses required 
for self-employment . . . from gross re-
ceipts." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(4)(a) 
(Supp.1995) (emphasis added). Section 78-
45-7.5(4)(a) further provides that "[t]he in-
come and expenses from self-employment 
. . . shall be reviewed to determine an appro-
priate level of gross income available to the 
parent to satisfy a child support award. 
Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may 
be deducted from gross receipts." Id. (em-
phasis added). Although the trial court is 
accorded discretion when applying section 
78-45-7.5(4), Jensen, 892 P2d at 1057; see 
also Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 
1067 (Utah App.1994) (stating trial court is in 
best position to determine what expenses are 
necessary), it must consider which expenses 
are necessary in order to make a child sup-
port determination. Thus, in order for this 
court to ensure that the trial court's calcula-
tion of plaintiffs gross income was rationally 
based, specific and detailed findings of fact 
on the issue are necessary: See Stevens, 754 
P.2d at 959. However, the court made no 
findings regarding the necessary expenses of 
the business, which was a highly contested 
issue between the parties. The lack of spe-
cific findings on this critical issue and the 
absence of a clear, uncontroverted record 
require that we reverse and remand the case 
to the trial court for specific findings to 
support its child support award.6 
C. Business Valuation 
[16-18] Lastly, defendant claims that the 
trial court's finding that the business had a 
value of $100,000 was in error.1 The trjaJ 
court's actions regarding the parties, proper-
ty interests " 'are entitled to a presumption 
6. "Our holding should not be interpreted to 
mean that the trial court's decision as to the 
amount of child support is incorrect, but oiiry 
that the court's findings of fact are insufficient to 
allow appellate review" of the trial court's deter-
mination of plaintiffs gross income for child 
support purposes. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 912. 
of validity.'" Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 Po^  
585, 588 (Utah App.1993) (quoting Argyk
 v 
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah lag*)) 
Thus, "ihe trial court's valuation of marital 
property will not be disturbed absent a clear 
abuse of discretion." Id. When challenge 
a trial court's findings of fact, the party must 
"marshal all the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings and then . . . show the evi. 
dence to be legally insufficient to support the 
findings." Rudman v. Rudman, 812 ?2<\ 73 
79 (Utah App.1991). If the party challenging 
the finding fails to marshal the supporting 
evidence, the trial court's finding will not be 
disturbed on appeal. See id* 
[19] After reviewing the record, we hold 
that not only was there a substantial amount 
of evidence presented to the trial court sup-
porting its finding regarding the value of the 
business, but defendant has failed to marshal 
that supporting evidence and demonstrate 
that it was unsupportive of the trial court's 
finding. Thus, we affirm the trial court's 
finding regarding the value of the business. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We hold that the trial court erred by fail-
ing to enter sufficient findings of fact regard-
ing the parties' financial needs and further 
erred by not considering plaintiffs income 
from his second job and the parties' un-
earned income when calculating the alimony 
award. Thus, we reverse and remand so the 
trial court may enter further findings in light 
of this opinion and reconsider the alimony 
award after it has entered the appropriate 
and necessary findings. 
Additionally, we reverse and remand the 
child support determination so sufficient find-
ings of fact may be entered regarding the 
necessary business expenses. If the trial 
court determines that the initial child sup-
port award was in error after considering the 
necessary expenses of the business, it may 
7. Although defendant attempts to couch her 
claim as a failure to enter findings regarding the 
return of investment value employed by the trial 
court her argument is essentially an attack 00 
the value the trial court assigned to the business. 
Thus, we treat it as such. 
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«iter a child support order consistent with 
its findings. 
Lastly, because the evidence supports the 
trial court's finding regarding the valuation 
of the business and because defendant has 
Med to correctly challenge this finding, we 
affirm the trial court's determination on this 
issue. 
GREENWOOD and WILKINS, JJ„ 
toncur. 
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Defendant moved to suppress kilogram 
of cocaine found in his car from his trial for 
possession of controlled substance with intent 
to distribute. The Fourth District Court, 
Juab County, Lynn W. Davis, J., denied mo-
tion. Defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Wilkins, J., held that defendant's 
consent to search of car was obtained 
trough exploitation of trooper's prior illegal 
conduct. 
Reversed. 
1
 Criminal Law <S=1144.12 
On appeal, Court of Appeals will recite 
***& adduced at suppression hearing in light 
toost favorable to trial court's ruling. 
1
 Criminal Law <s=>1134(3), 1158(4) 
On appeal from the denial of motion to 
f*Ppress, questions of law will be reviewed 
or
 correctness, and trial court's findings of 
fact that underlie its determination will not 
be reversed unless clearly erroneous. 
3. Criminal Law <S»394.1(3) 
Whether defendant's consent to search 
is sufficiently attenuated from taint of 
Fourth Amendment violation to permit intro-
duction of evidence at trial depends on the 
purpose and flagrancy of the official miscon-
duct, the temporal proximity of the illegality 
and consent, and the presence of intervening 
circumstances. UJ3.CA ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Criminal Law <s»394.4(l) 
Court's examination of deterrence in 
context of Fourth Amendment analysis must 
be made with reference to law enforcement 
generally, rather than to one officer particu-
larly. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Criminal Law <&=>394.4(9) 
Trial court should not have focused ex-
clusively on particular trooper's behavior fol-
lowing seizure of cocaine in defendant's car 
to evaluate deterrent value of suppression for 
purposes of determining whether defendant's 
consent was obtained by exploitation of ille-
gal arrest. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Searches and Seizures ^»182 
Trooper's question, asking defendant if 
he could search defendant's car for drugs 
and weapons during traffic stop, after receiv-
ing negative result from a National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC) stolen vehicle 
check was improper, since question bore no 
relation to issue of whether vehicle was sto-
len. U.S.CA. Constj\mend. 4. 
7. Criminal Law <s=>394.1(3) 
Although defendant's consent to search 
car was voluntary in fact, trooper impermis-
sibly obtained consent through exploitation of 
prior illegal continued detention of defen-
dant, since there was not sufficient attenua-
tion between impermissible question of 
whether defendant had any narcotics or 
weapons in car and defendant's consent to 
search. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
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